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In 1928 Hip~lito lrigoyen was the most popular President that the Argentine
people had eiected.

Two years later his popularity hod evaporated and a few

hundred mll il-ary cadets ollsted the government.
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erotic tradition.

The reasons go beyond this

Argentino, contrary to populoI' belief, did not have a dcmo
The nation had been ruled by the dominant economic inter

ests up to 1916.
In 1916, Hipelito Irigoyen was elected to his first term.
peeted h:m to provide them with a decent and honorable !ife.

The people ex
But in choosing

the legal path of eleci-ions instead of revoiutio1'r Irigoyen prc-empl'ed any revolu
tionary social changes.

In 1928, Irigoyen, at 76, surpdsed his opponents and won a second term.
He was loved by the people as he had embodied their spirit.

But lrigoyen

considered his victory as a mandate from the people, not on election.

As

the ends justified the means, the government operated on the margin of
legality.

lrigoyen had abandoned the principles that he had fought to main

tain for over thirty years.

This could have been tolerated if lrigoyen had

enacted some pervasive social measures to maintain his support.
permitted the usurped power to remain idle.
slowed to a snail's pace.

Instead he

The governmental processes

Appointments were not made, contracts were not

signed, payments were not made whi Ie the President was intent upon increasing
his power for power alone.

The governmental inactivity and usurpations caused

a wove of political unrest which culminated in the military golpe de estado of
September 6, 1930.
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PREFACE

On April 1, 1928, after six years out of office, Hip~lito Irigoyen was elected
to his second term as President of the Argentine Republic with 57 per cent of the
vote.

He was unquestionably the most popular President that Argenti na had ever

elected.

On inauguration day, October 12, 1928, the crowds jubilantly pulled

his carriage through the streets.
The optimism of the people was unbounding.

During the 1920's they had

achieved unparalleled and ever increasing prosperity.

Now, through their caudillo,

they hoped to achieve some social justice.
But there was a shadow over Argentina.
conduct a full day's work as President.

Irigoyen at 76 was no longer able to

As the economy declined, administrative

procedures stagnated, and political turmoil increased.

On September 6, 1930,

General Jose' F. Uriburu with 600 cadets from the Colegio Militar overthrew the
government.

In justifying his action to the relieved populace, Uriburu as pro

visional President proclaimed:
Answering the clamor of the people, and with the Army
and Navy's patriotic support, we have assumed the govern
ment of the nation.
As the representatives of order, and having been taught
to respect the law and the institutions, we have witnessed,
perplexed, the unhinging that the country has suffered in
recent years.
III

iv

Administrative inertia and corruption, lack of justice,
anarchy in the universities, improvisation and squandering
in economic and financial matters, depressing favoritism
as a bureaucratic system, politics as the main occupation
of the government, destructive and denigrating action in
the Army and Navy, international discredit achieved
through the open rejection of law, attitudes and expressions
showing an aggressive disculture, exaltation of subalterns,
abuse, trampling, fraud, larceny and crime, are all but a
pa Ie reflection of that whi ch the country has had to tolerate.
When appealing to force, in order to liberate the nation
of this ominous regime, we have done so inspired in a high
and generous idea I. Events, on the other hand I wi II demon
strate that the good of the nation is the only purpose that
leads us.
A golpe de estado!

Rather a successful golpe.

No government had been

turned out of office in Argentina by the use of arms since 1862.

The Argentina

of 1928 was considered the most stable democracy in Latin America.

How could

such a viable democracy be overthrown so easily?
Unfortunately much was a facade.

Popular democracy had only begun in

1914 when SO'enz Pena's electoral reform granted universal manhood sufferage.
The people had not fully learned to use the ballot.

The government was top-

heavy with an executive who dominated the Congress.

For this system to

function properly it was essential that the President keep the machinery of state
running.

It could not function by itself.

smoothly everything became disjointed.

And without the government running
This was the crisis faced in 1930: the

system had broken down.
This thesis is directed to providi ng an answer to the reasons for the revolution
within the administration.

The material is presented in three chapters.

The first

v

"Prelude to 1928" provides the background to the 1928-1930 period, with special
emphasis on Hi~lito Irigoyen's role.

The second section

II

1928-September 6,

1930 11 covers the factors within the administration that led to the revolution:
Hip6lito Irigoyen1s background and philosophy of government; administrative
response to the economic problems; intervention in the provinces; negation of
Congress; interference in the armed forces; the opposition's reaction to inept
government; and the administration's final incompetence in confronting the on
coming revolt.

The third chapter interprets the material of the first two chapters.
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CHAPTER I

PRELUDE TO 1928

Until 1916 an aristocracy composed of the dominant economic interests
firmly controlled the political life of the nation.
economy.

Argentina had an agrarian

Landownership was synonymous with political and economic power

as well as social prestige.

A comparatively small number of well-established

families held the great bulk of the land, most of which was leased out under
tenancy to sma II formers. 1
The majority of the people had little, if any, formal education.

They

were dependent on the minority for employment as agrarian workers.
For the first fifty-two years of the national period the Argentine political
experience was one of strong-man rule, both at the provincial and national
levels.

The period was one of strife and civil war.

The outcome of elections

was determined by a political groups1s success in the control of polling places,
either by intimidation of the voters or stuffing of the ballot boxes.

Even after

the adoption of the Federal Constitution of 1853 the situation was little better,
as voting was still not secret. 2

Due to this there was tremendous apathy in

elections--a fifteen per cent turnout of eligible voters was considered high
until 1916. 3

2

But an influx of immigrants was to challenge the aristocracy's control of
politics.
Until 1853, there was little immigration to Argentina, but shortly after
mid-century, a flow of Europeans began to arrive.

Many of these were

Italians and Spaniards, searching for new opportunities in a frontier country. 4
Most of them hoped to settle on the rich land and farm as they had done
in Europe, but outside of a very few colonizing efforts, little land was avail
able.

Consequently, the majority tended to concentrate in the cities and

become shopkeepers, tradesmen and small manufacturers.
The first Argentine census, that of 1869, reported 298,854 foreigners out
of a total population of 1,830,214.

By 1895 their numbers had increased to

an estimated 1,500,000 out of a population of 4,000,000. 5
They proved more proficient than the natives in economic activities.
More and more they controlled the import trade, 6 but as few of the immigrants
were citizens, they had no voice in government.

They were also much disliked

by wealthy Argentines, who referred to them as gringos.
The Brithh invested more capital in Argentina than in any other area except
her colonies and the United States.

Naturally, Britain wished to use Argentina

as a market for her own goods, and encouraged low tariffs on the part of the
Argenti ne government.
Argentina, needing British investment, complied.
favoring the import of British manufactured goods.

Tariffs were kept low,

3

Argentina's own local industry would have to suffer, but this was a problem
which concerned neither her governing families nor the British. 7
Key positions in British enterprises were kept in foreign hands.

Here, too,

the new and growing Argentine middle class was excluded.
During the latter part of the nineteenth century the immigrants loomed as
a new force on the Argentine political scene.

Far from being politically or

economically complacent, or satisfied to occupy a menial position in society,
they were filled with enthusiasm for political expression and social equality.
Argentina was their new home.

Since most of them were of Latin stock, they

assimilated well into the society, and many of them married Argentine women.
The beginning of the end for the aristocracy's absolute control of political
affairs came with the administration of General Julio A. Roca in 1880.

At

the time the country was experiencing an unprecedented prosperity and rising
inflation.
Argentine prosperity was due to the rising population in Europe and the
technical developments of the refrigerator steamship and the railroad which
permitted cheap transportation of beef and grain to Europe.

Railroad mileage

increased at an astounding rate: in 1857 the first track was laid; in 1890,

9,500 kilometers were in service; by 1914, there were 33,500 kilometers,
with an investment of 1,317 mi Ilion gold pesos (the peso was on par with one
dollor U.S.).

1890 to 1914. 8

Coupled with this was a 500 per cent increase of exports from

4

The Argentine aristocracy appreciated the British investment of this period.
At a London banquet given by the financial house of Baring Brothers in 1887,
former President Julio A. Roca stated:
The Argentine Republic, which will someday be a great
nation, wi II never forget that the present state of progress and
prosperity is due, in great part, to Er!glish capital, which has
no fear of distance and which has been invested there in con
siderable quantities in the form of railroads, streetcars, colo
nies, mineral exploitation, and other enterprises. 9
The influx of foreign capital brought with it heavy debt-service payments.
The payments were made difficult by current unfavorable trade balances, but
the inflow of capital continued unabated, resulting in increased inflation.
Inflation reached its climax during the succeeding administration of Miguel
JuO'rez Celman.

Since both Roca and Jucrrez were representatives of the landed

pastoral interests, there was little reason for them to stop the mounting superinflation which eventually led to wide-scale business failures.

The pastoral in

terests, wealthy from the export trade, actually profited from the runaway economy,
since they received payment for their products in British pounds or French francs.
The value of these latter currencies was constantly rising in relation to their own. 10
The majority of people, however, did not profit from inflation.

Many were

able to save during the early part of the decade, but after 1887 most of their sav
ings were wiped out.

Although salaries increased, they rose slower than prices.

Merchants found import goods too expensive to buy, and many independent shopkeep
ers and small manufacturers, faced with bankruptcy, were absorbed by larger
concerns.

5
Until now the middle and iower classes hod been unorganized for any
political action.

This experience, however, caused industrialists, small mer

chants, and many tenant formers to unite.

Out of the mounting resentment

and grumblings over governmental extravagancies grew organization. 11
Early in 1889, over 10,000 people from all sections of the country gathered
on a tennis court in Buenos Aires to air their grievances against the oligarchical
government.

Under the leadership of a little-known man, named Leopoldo

,

Alem, on organization called the Uni6'n Civica de 10 Juventud (Civic Youth
Union) was formed. 12

Although its followers were of diverse political beliefs,

they all agreed on one thing: the regime hod ruled too long in favor of a small
minority, and the only way that the grievous economic situation could be im
proved was by giving the majority its rightful voice in government and putting
the notion's democratic ideals into practice.
The Unitn Ci~ica de 10 Juventud, like its successor, the Unio'n Ci~ica
Radical·(Radical Civic Union}, mode no appeals to anyone group or closs.

It

was more a moss movement without definite principles, but it was a means of
expression for the inarticulate mosses against the estanciero dominated aristoc
racy.

It embraced many groups of varied interests and backgrounds. 13

AI though

most were immigrant tradesmen and artisans, there were some former supporters of
the oligarchy, like General Bortolome'Mitre, one-time President of the Republic,
and Arist6bulo del Volle.

The movement was a great catchall for the dissatisfied

mosses, and its numbers grew not only in Buenos Ai res but throughout the provinces
as well.

6
".

The Union Civica de la Juventud proposed the protection of institutions
and public liberties, suffrage without fraud, persecution of corrupt officials,
purity of administration and to fight against the violation of provincial
autonomy.14

The program was general; as such it became a catchall for

all elements.
But they were soon disappointed in the government IS reaction to their
program.

The elections of February 9, 1890, were exceptionally violent

and fradulent. 15 With the situation deteriorating, the only road open was
revolution.
On July 26, 1890, the revolution began, but despite the aid received
from army officers who directed it, the revolt was a failure.

The rebels were

defeated after several days of bitter fighting in which 1100 were killed or
wounded.

Although the would-be revolutionari es were discouraged they had

at least won a moral victory.

The government, discredited by its economic

policies and the revolt, was a dead letter, 16 and in view of the preceding
events, President Juarez Celman resigned in favor of the Vice President, Carlos
Pe lIegri ni •
The period from the revolt of 1890 until 1916 was filled with increasing
turmoil and agitation.

By 1895 one quarter of the national population was

foreign born, and this element outnumbered native Argentines in every enter
prise except agriculture.
in its hands. 17

Also urban commercial trade was almost exclusively

Coupled with the growing number of immigrants was the influx

of new revolutionary ideas of social, economic, and political equality. 18

7

The Uni6n Crvica de 10 Juventud was reorganized l becoming the Uni6'n
C(vica Radical (U.C.R.). 19

Its bases of support were the immigrants l urban

merchants l clerks, and professional men l and the small landowners l especially
from Santa Fe.
crisis.

All had been hurt by the rising inflation and the financial

The leaders of the party, except Leandro Alem and Del Valle, were

quite young and extremely idealistic.

This youth and idealism were the hall

marks of the party for years to come. 20
Alem's nephew, Hip61ito Irigoyen /21 soon became the central figure of the
U.C.R. of Buenos Aires province.

He came to believe that the solution to

Argentine problems was quite simple--institute a system of free suffrage .22
Because elections were not free l Irigoyen proposed the principle of abstention
in elections.

Coupled with this was the principle of intransigencYI or un

willingness to compromise with others for immediate gains.

These logically

resulted in the doctrine that revolution was the only means available, under
the circumstances, for gaining power.

These principles were uncompromisingly

adhered to by Irigoyen.
In 1893 1 the U.C.R. led another revolution.

As Del Valle was in the

cabinet of President Luis Saenz Pena he forestalled government actions for some
time.

Hip61ito lrigoyen installed a Radical government in La Plata.

the holiday did not last.
returned to power. 23

However,

Federal troops routed the rebels and the conservatives

8

Immediately after the failure of the revolution, Alem started preparations
for a new revolution, but his nephew, Irigoyen, would not support him, and
without Buenos Aires province, no revolution could succeed.
Probably a successful revolution would have made Alem President.
apparently for this reason, withheld his support.
could rescue the Argentine .24

Irigoyen,

Irigoyen felt he--and only he-

After 1893, Alem became disi lIusioned and on

July I, 1896, he committed suicide.

Hip61ito lrigoyen now led the party.

De

termined to remain intransigent, he nearly destroyed it.
Juan B. Justo left in 1894 to found the Partido Socialista Argentino..
de la Torre resigned in 1897 because of his conflicts with Irigoyen.

Lisandro

De la Torre's

departure was most damaging, as he was popular as well as brilliant. 25
From 1897 to 1904 the U.C.R. was dead as a national party, but Irigoyen
took no heed, spending his time rebuilding the party and preparing for another
revolution.
On February 4, 1905, revolts broke out simultaneously in Buenos Aires, Bahi~
Blanca, Santa Fe, Mendoza and COrdoba.

After brief success, the revolution

failed as Buenos Ai res cou Id not be secured. 26
By 1905 it was clear that Irigoyen had decided he and the U.C.R. should have
complete control or have nothing to do with the government.

At this time the

U. C. R. probably would have had a large number of congressmen and several cabinet
positions had the party been under moderate leadership.27
all or nothing.

But lrigoyen insisted on

He worked more on revolutionary plans to place the U.C.R.

power than on electoral reforms.

In

9
This may be a reason for the lack of a party program.

The Radicals talked

of popular sovereignty and administrative morality but they did not attempt to
explain their political and economic policies.
lrigoyen stated on May 13, 1905, that the revolt having failed, the U.C.R.
would return to the passive revolution--boycotting all elections. 28

Revolution,

not election, was the goal of HipcSl ito Irigoyen and the U. C. R.
The election of Roque SO'enz Pel1a on April 12, 1910, was a decisive event
for Argentine Radicalism.

The new President was well known by many of the

U.C.R. leaders, including Irigoyen.
Pe'na met with Irigoyen.

Shortly after the election, Roque S&'enz

After he had offered the U.C.R. positions in the

cabinet, lrigoyen replied, /lOur determination not to participate in the govern
ment is immutable; the only thing that could change our resolution is honour
able elections guaranteed by electoral reform. 1129

The President was already

convinced that the electoral system should be revised and he and Irigoyen held
a series.of conferences on the reform.
The new law provided for permanent compulsory registration at age 18 (tied
to compulsory military service), and a secret, obligatory, universal male vote. 30
An added feature was the incomplete list on which a voter could only vote for
two-thirds of the candidates on his ballot for the members of the Chamber of
Deputies (each party published its own ballot for the voter),

Although this was

supposed to ensure minority representation, it did not, as the candidate with the
highest number of votes, regardless of party, was elected.
all the seats. 31

But the law was a tremendous step forward.

One party had taken

10

However, it meant nothing if not fairly administered.

The U. C. R. wanted

assurances that elections would be fair and wanted to be certain that they could
win before they would enter any elections.

They were not disappointed on

All-hough Roque Stienz Pena died in August of 1914, the new

either count.

President, Victoriano de la Plaza, assured free elections. 32
ditions, the U. C. R. entered the Presidential race for 1916.

Under these con
As expected,

Hip61ito lrigoyen was their candidate.
When Irigoyen was nominated, the U. C. R. split into two factions, both
supporting him,

One faction, headed by Vincente Gallo, was opposed to

Irigoyen's complete dominance of the party.
a political party with a definite program.

They wanted to make the U.C.R.
The other faction, the maiority, sup

ported Irigoyen's thought that the U.C.R. was a movement to save the nation.
Since the lrigoyen faction carried the day, the U. C. R. never proposed a platform,
just their regenerative ideas for the nation. 33
The Presidential election was uneventful with Irigoyen winning as expected.
But out of a population of 7,704,383 people only 15 per cent were registered to
vote and only 62 per cent of these voted.
cent voted.

Out of the total population only 9 per

Irigoyen received votes from only 4 per cent of the total population,

28 per cent of the registered voters, and 45 per cent of those who actually voted.
The breakdown of the vote was as follows:
Party
Uni6n Ci~ica Radical
Partido Democr~ti cO-Progresista
Partido Conservador
Partido Socialista

Candidate
Irigoyen
De la Torre
Rojas
Justo

Votes

Electoral Votes

339,332

152

123,637

20
104

153,406
52,895

14 34

11

lrigoyen's first administration was the first freely elected government that
Argentina had experienced.

As such it was a step towards democratic

government.
Irigoyen did express the hopes of the masses for a better life, but by choos
ing the ballot box instead of revolution he eliminated the possibility of revolu
tionary change.

The conservative-dominated Congress did block many of his

programs, especially in the Senate.
lrigoyen belatedly counterattacked the conservatives by intervening in
the provinces, producing free elections that sent Radicals to the Chamber and
eventually the Senate.

Finally lrigoyen obtained some social legislation from

Congress, but it was not as much as he had hoped for.

In his insistent demands

he was too overbearing for many of the prominent members of the U. C. R.
Irigoyen felt that his election was a popular mandate, that the people
wanted him to begin the nation IS regeneration.

In this respect he said:

I know well that I am not a governor of the common order,
because there is no power that could have persuaded me to
take such a position. I am the enforcer of the supreme
mandate of the people, whose duty it is to comply with the
just and legitimate aspirations of the Argentine people. 35
The election returns do not support lrigoyenls view.

Although he could

scarcely be said to have a "supreme mandate of the people, II his administration
was the first that was truly representative of them.
of Radicalism, wrote:

Carlos Ibarguren, a critic

12

This government of Yrigoyen was, in our history, very
representative, truly representative, not because it signified
an electoral maiority, but because it left the destiny of the
state, and that of its political springs under the domain of a
vast layer of Argentine society, which up to that moment
had never gravitated nor ascended to power, and which con
stituted one of the basic layers on which was seated the new
Argentine immigration. The historian must consider that
important evolution was necessary at that moment, a result
of the electoral reform accompl ished by President Saenz Pena,
who with his statesman's outlook saw that in these new founda
tions of our country there was compressed a huge reservoir of
citizenry to which it was indispensable to give an outlet in
civic life in order that it would not violently and rebelliously
break the dike that was suffociating it. 36
When the U. C. R. agreed to enter elections in 1912 it gave up the possibility
of gaining power through revolution and creating a government that could produce
revolutionary changes.

Instead, the U.C.R. chose to work within the system

which cemented it to the previous regime.
Upon assuming the Presidency, Irigoyen was able to choose between two
roads: permit the system to remain intact, leaving the Congress, where the oppo
sition retained a majority, with its powers which would be a roadblock, or sweep
away the old system illegally.

In choosing the legal route, he realized he would

not be able to fulfill the desires of the people. 37
The Congress, until 1918, proved a roadblock to his social legislation.

What

laws did pass were declared unconstitutional by a hostile Supreme Court.
The only legal tool Irigoyen possessed to subdue the opposition was intervention
in the provinces.
Intervention was the constitutional device by which the federal government was
permHted to temporarily assume control of the affairs of some or all of the provinces

13
(litemporarilyll in theory; in practice some interventions lasted for years).
When a state of intervention was enacted, provincial and municipal governments
in the area involved were disbanded.

An appointed official with absolute power

(an interventor) was sent to Ihe province. 38
The interventor was responsible only to whoever appoi nted him (either the
Congress or the President).

He did not have to abide by provincial laws, and

remained in complete control of the province until recalled by whoevar appointed
him.

By the time the period of intervention was over, the administration party

usually had control of the province. 39
lrigoyen considered the governments of the conservatively dominated provinces
to be illegal and immoral.

They had perpetuated themselves through force and

fraud at election time. 40
lrigoyen intervened in every province at least once, in five provinces twice,
and in San Juan three times.

These were more interventions than had been

attempted by any two Presidents before him. 41
Unfortunately, lrigoyen timed his interventions poorly.

He should have inter

vened in all the provinces upon his inauguration, making a clean sweep and making
his intentions clear.
1917.

Instead, he did not intetvene in any province until April,

This partly explains the U.C.R.'s inability to gain control of the Senate.

(Another part of the explanation being that Senators served nine-year terms.)
Interventions did insure free elections in the provinces.

When Irigoyen was

inaugurated, the U.C.R. controlled only three provinces: Entre R(os, Cordoba,

14

and Santa Fe.

In 1918 the U.C.R. gained sixteen seats in the Chamber of

Deputies, giving it a slight majority.
the 158 seats in the Chamber.

By 1920 the U.C.R. secured 105 of

lrigoyen's intervention policies had been a

partial success. 42
Part of lrigoyen's overall program of government for the people was to
improve the standard of living among the middle and lower classes through
social legislation.

Shortly after inauguration he sent a series of bi lis whi ch

would have established a minimum wage, maximum hours and compensation
insurance.

Most were stopped in Congress and the few that passed were de

clared unconstitutional.
Some progress was made without legislation; workers' pay doubled during
this period while working hours were reduced from ten to eight per day.

This

was due in part to the Administration's lenient attitude about most strikes.

In

1921 a modified workers' code was passed.
In education, lrigoyen made great progress.

Many schools were built,

enrollment rose 50 per cent and illiteracy was reduced to 14 per cent by 1922.
A much needed university reform bill was passed.
A series of laws enacted needed public health programs: maternity benefits,
a general sanitation bill, and extensive water purification programs.

The result

was a reduction of the mortality rate. 43
Irigoyen favored increased government participation in the economy.

While

he did want the state to assume supervision of the nation's few industries, trans
portation, public utilities, subsoil and land, he did not favor nationalization.

15
Naturally his policies were opposed by the conservatives, but the Socialists
also condemned them as too conservative.
most clearly in his action on petroleum.

lrigoyen's philosophy came out
In 1919 an executive decree stated

that petroleum was the property of the state and no longer open to private
exploitation. 44
In 1922, the Yacimientos Petrol(feros Fiscales was formed, giving the
government a monopoly on the production of all petroleum products.
lrigoyen also hoped for some agrarian reform.

He wanted the people who

worked the land to be able to own it and increase production.

Congress was

adamant in blocking any land reform; however, Irigoyen did open one agri
cultural colony project. 45

Production did rise but it was due to the demand

caused by the World War, not government policies.
lrigoyen's policy of neutrality during World War I, although severely
criticized, brought unprecented prosperity and inflation.
nation's increasing exports were far exceeding imports.

Until 1920 the
However, this was

offset as Argentina was dependent upon importing most manufactured items and
many processed foodstuffs.
caused by the war.

Inflation set indue to the scarci ty of these goods

This inflation caused the bloody metallurgical strike in

January of 1919 and its suppression by the police.

Although there was inflation

the profits made from the war were used to finance Irigoyen's domestic projects. 46
The charge most often leveled against this administration was that of corrup
tion.

Irigoyen was not part of it, and he was probably blind to it even though it

16

occurred in front of him.

Ysabel Rennie, who admired lrigoyen, wrote:

Argentina was treated to an orgy of spoils politics in which
ministers lined their own pockets and found employment for
their family and friends, and in which men who were mediocre
filled all the offices from school teacher to chemist •.. They
had in their ranks few men like Thoma's Le Bre'ton and Marcelo
T. AI vear who were men of the Noventa and whom everyone
respected. But the rank and file were political hangers-on
and with no interest beyond their personal gain. The intransi
gent men, the idealists, the men of the calibre of Justo and
de la Torre, had been sacrificed to Irigoyen's dictatorial leader
ship, and were lost for good. 47
Towards the end of his six-year term, Irigoyen made some tentative overtures
to the Congressional leaders of the Radicals to see if he could persuade them to
amend the Constitution in such a manner as to make him eligible for immediate re
election. 48

When nothing came of the plan, kigoyen let it be known that he

wanted Marcelo T. Alvear to be President.

Alvear defeated the opposition with

55 per cent of the vote. 49
During the first Radical administration the opposition had created an antiRadical front.

By 1922 new circumstances pointed out the existence of fissures

in the governing party, causing the opposition to adopt a new tactic: to approve
of these internal divisions, directing their criticism at the abusive personalism of
Irigoyen.

The opposition had praised distinguished members of Congress who had

shown themselves to have integrity and independence in respecting the populace,
not the Radica I party. 50
In continuing this policy the conservatives were able not only to indirectly
control the new governmen~ but also to displace the Radical majority in the Chamber,
strengthen themselves in the provinces, and maintain their undisputed control of the
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Senate.

This tactic permitted, in spite of the large majority that the Radicals

obtained at the polls, paralysis of progressive legislation.

In 1926, it enabled

the opposition 1"0 win an absolute majority in the Chamber, to sit on the nation
alization of petroleum, and to maintain their majority in the Senate until the
revolution. 51
The group that the conservatives courted was the wing or the U. C. R.
known as the ~ules (the lrigoyen faction being the rojos), who in 1916 were
opposed to Irigoyen's dominance.

This azul group led by Gallo, Cantillo,

Le Briton, and Melo, had wanted the U.C.R. to adopt a definite program.
But they were a minority.

Within the next several years they did manage to

gain control of several provincial committees.

In December of 1918, the

azules issued a manifesto stating:
(1) Radicalism should be independent of all extraneous forces,
especially personal ism.
(2) Party and government separation should be absolute.
(3) The party should adopt a program in relation to the pressing
political, economic, and social problems.
(4) The Radical ideal is to assure good public administration.
It is the duty of the party to criticize those who do not fulfill
these conditions. 52
While lrigoyen was not mentioned, it was obvious that the azul wing of the
party was dissatisfied with his administration and would not contain their criticism.
Upon assuming the Presidency, Alvear made it clear that he would not be a
puppet of lrigoyen.

His first act was to fill his cabinet with men dissatisfied by

lrigoyen's government.

Of eight ministers/ only one was a friend of Irigoyen.

Alvear realized that if he filled his government with hi politistas/ Irigoyen/ not
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Alvear would govern.

Irigoyen felt betrayed. 53

The azules felt this

government was a mandate for those opposed to the rojos.

In the Chamber

and in the provinces both factions of the U.C.R. took positions.
The first conflict came between the Vice President Gonz61ez (a staunch
hipolitista) and senators who were opposed to Irigoyen.

This rupture between

the Senate and its natural President indicated the pattern of the coming crisis
of Radicalism.
In December 1922, while the credentials of the alvearistas of Jujuy
province were being discussed, the hipolitista faction in the Senate boycotted
the session to avoid a quorum, so the minority resolved to forcefully require
their presence.

(The minority action was neither illegal nor unusual.)

Vice President resisted the resolution to apply force.

The

This produced a grave

incident concluding in a vote of censure of Gonzalez's action.

The U.C.R.

Senators, Melo, Torino, Saguier, and Gallo, all azules, voted with the con
servatives.
Worse, the Senate voted to resume the power to appoint internal commissions,
traditionally delegated to the Vice President.

Saguier proposed the measure.
;

The U.C.R. committees of Buenos Aires, Entre Rios, and Corrientes condemned
this action. 54
The split was formalized in February 1924 when the dissident Radicals, directed
by Isaias R. Amado, Mario Guido and the new Minister of Interior, Vincente Gallo,
planned the intervention of Buenos Aires to oust the irigoyenista government.
never took place.)

(I~

19

In the 1924 elections the U. C. R. elected eighty Deputies.
maintained their allegiance to Irigoyen.

Fifty of these

The conservatives, Socialists and

dissident Radicals elected Mario Guido as President of the Chamber.
The pure Radicals considered this election a product of the contubernio
(concubinage).

The hipolitista Deputy Dr. Andres Ferreyra complained:

We have as our President of the Republic, Dr. Alvear, who
synthesized our ideas, but during our internol fights he has
changed his course. But what is happening now? What is
the danger? The danger that we see is that without con
sulting the populace, the government has decided to intrigue
with the conservatives, who have been repudiated at the
polls... For this I protest: because I know what has been
taken from the people, that which the people legitimately
gave to Radicalism .•. the conservatives do not have the right
to direct the destiny of the nation. 55
The lines were definitive.

In July 1924 the dissidents organized a party.

In August they held their first meeting of the Partido Anti -Personalistas.
Most of the intellectuals, professors and lawyers of the U.C.R./ as well as
the old alemistas, moved over to the Anti-Personalistas.

In general they were

more conservative and less nationalistic than the personalistas (followers of
Irigoyen) .56
In the 1926 elections the anti-Irigoyen forces triumphed.

The Radical Anti-

Personalistas allied with the other Radical factions in San Juan and Mendoza-
the cantonistas and lencinistas-- the Partido Conservador de Buenos Aires and a
number of other provincial splinter groups.

The election results were:
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Party

Votes

Deputies

Union Civica Radical

335,840

38

Anti -Personal istas and
their allies

206, 182

20

Conservative groups

166,753

20

93,747

4

Socialists

57

Translated into electoral votes, no party would have received a majority.
The strong showing of the Anti-Personalistas and the conservative groups
was in part due to the unprecedented prosperity that the nation was experi
encing.

The value of land increased at an astronomical rate, and wages

went up much faster than prices, thus giving the middle and lower classes
perhaps the most comfortable standard of living they had yet experienced. 58

As the 1928 Presidential election approached, the Socialists proposed the
intervention of Buenos Aires Province, as the U. C. R. had maintained its control.
The opposition began to plan their electoral campaign around the proposed
Buenos Aires intervention, as Buenos Aires' electora! votes would decide the
election. 59

Alvear, however, was too honest to implement this intervention.

He said to the Anti-Personalista candidate:
Melo, my friend, to intervene in Buenos Aires I would have
to decide to commit a truly dictatorial act that could not be
legally justified in any way. I will not do this nor will
I commit any act like this even if it benefits me; much less
to do this as a favor to you. I will not intervene. Go to
the street and fight with your appropriate forces and win in
a good manner if you can.
Irigoyen's victory was decided. 60
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The anti-Radical forces felt assured of victory.
in the 1926 elections.

Prosperity continued.

They had polled a majority

The conservatives had maintained

reduced power in cOrdoba, Corrientes, Salta, and San Luis.
the following parties of the IIright":

They had formed

Conservador de Buenos Aires; Liberal y

Autonomista de Corrientes; Liberal de Tucum6n; Uni6'n Provincial de Salta;
Liberal de Mendoza; Concentracion Conservadora de Entre Ri~Si DemocrO'tico
de C6rdoba; Liberal de San Luis; Liberal de Santiago del Estero; Concel1traci~n
de Catamarca; Conservador de La Rioja. 61

In order to confront the personalistas

they formed a coalition with the Partido Anti-Personalista ticket of Mello-Gallo.
The opposition misjudged Irigoyen's popularity.

There were even many con

servatives who preferred Irigoyen to the Mero-Gollo ticket. 62
gently reinforced the U.C.R.

Irigoyen had di li

But more important, the "betrayal" of Alvear re

inforced the mosses' feeling that lrigoyen was their only true representative.
Although Irigoyen did not campaign, he amassed an astounding victory:
Candi date - Party

Popular vote

Electoral vote

Irigoyen - Union Ci~ica Radical

838,583

245

Me[o - Frente Unico

414,026

71

Mantienzo - Partido Socialisto

64,985

3

Others

33,368

o 63

At this time the total population of Argentina was 10,136,738.
17 per cent were registered to vote.
voted.

Of this number

All totalled 14 per cent of the population

It was on 81 per cent turnout of the voters (1,481,671), which was very
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high.

Irigoyen rece ived 57 per cent of the vote but only 8 per cent of the total

population voted for him.
Irigoyen also carried a tremendous impact in the election of the Deputies.
The U.C.R. won 60 of the 88 seats up for re-election.
representation in the Chamber to 92. 64

This increased their

lrigoyen and the U. C. R. considered the

election a complete mandate from the people.

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER I

1Austin F. Macdonald, Government of the Argentine Republic (New York:
Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1942), p. 343. In the 1940's more than two
thirds of the total area of Buenos Aires Province and Santa Fe were held in vast
properties of over 2,500 acres by few families.
2Macdonald, p. 85.
3Macdonald, p. 87.
4John W. White, Argentina: The Life Story of a Nation (New York: The
Viking Press, 1942), p. 123.
5James R. Scobie, Argentina: A City and a Nation (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1964), p. 119.
6Scobie, p. 119.
7Aldo Ferrer, The Argentine Economy, trans. Marjory M. Urquidi (Berkeley
and los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), p. 103.
8Ernesto Tornquist & Co., ltd., The Economic Development of the Argentine
Republic in the last 50 Years (Buenos Aires: n.p., 1919), pp. 117-54.
9Cesar Barros Hurtado, Hada una democracia orgcfnica (Buenos Aires, 1943),
p. 193, quoted in Robert Wilson Davenport, liThe Revolution of 1930 in Argentina"
(unpublished Master's Thesis, History Department, University of California at
Berkeley, 1953), p. 9.
10ysabel F. Rennie, The Argentine Republic (New York: The Macmillan
Company, 1945), p. 178.
11Rennie, p. 179.
12Rennie, p. 184.

23

24

13Peter G. Snow, Argentine Radicalism: The History and Doctrine of the
Radical Civic Union (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1965), p. 12.
14Alvaro Yunque, Leandro N. Alem: EI hombre de 10 multitud (Buenos Aires:
Editorial Americana, 1953), p. 263.
15Yunque, p. 266.
16Gabriel del Mazo, EI Radicalismo: Notas sobre su historia y doctrina
(Buenos Aires: Editorial Raigal, 1955), p. 7.
17Rennie, p. 186.
18Rennie, p. 184.
19The Union Ci'vica Radical or U.C.R. was also called the Radical Party or
Radicals.
2 0S now, p. 14.
211rigoyen is the official spelling; however Hipolito spelled his name Yrigoyen.
Both spellings are used.
22S now, p. 19.
23Rennie, p. 193.
24Manuel Galvez, Vida de Hip&'lito Yrigoyen: el hombre del misterio, 2d ed.
(Buenos Aires: Ediciones Anaconda, 1939), p. 105.
25S now , p. 20.
26S now , p. 23.
27Snow, p. 24.
2 8 Carlos J. Rodriguez, lrigoyen su revolucion pol(tica y social (Buenos Aires:
liLa Facultad, II 1943), p. 125.
29S now , p. 25.
30S now I p. 26.

25

31Macdonald, pp. 111-15. This law had produced grotesque results. In
one election the party that received 27 per cent of the votes received two-thirds
of the seats. Another party that recei ved 17 per ce nt of the votes recei ved one
third of the seats. Fifty-six per cent of the voters were unrepresented.
32S now , p. 27.
33S now , p. 30.
34 Roberto Etchepareborda, "Aspectos polfticos de la crisis de 1930," Revista
de Historia (No.3, 1958), pp. 16-17.
351smael Bucich Escobar, Historia de los presidentes Argentinos (Buenos Aires:
Roldan, 1934), p. 477.
36Carlos Ibarguren, La historia que he vivido (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Peuser,
1955), p. 316.
37Etchepareborda, "Aspectos," p. 18.
38part I, Article 6 of the Argentine Constitution of 1853 granted intervention.
Court rulings have given Congress the exclusive right to intervention when in session,
Snow, p. 32.
39Macdonald, pp. 169-89, fully covers the powers of the interventor and the
entire intervention procedure.
4OEtchepareborda, "Aspectos," p. 19.
41 Rosendo A. Gomez, "Intervention in Argentina, 1860-1930," Inter-American
Economic Affairs, ':3 (December, 1947), p. 69,
42Etchepareborda, "Aspectos," p. 20.
43Proposed and enacted social legislation is covered in Alfonso Diaz,
EI Presidente Yrigoyen y su misi6'n hist6rica (Buenos Aires: Editorial Tor, 1929),
pp. 105-8 and in Silvano Santander, Yrigoyen (Buenos Aires: Editorial La Fragua
S. R. L., 1965), pp. 56-72.
44Gabriel del Mazo, ed.

EI pensamiento escrito de Yrigoyen, 2d ed. (Buenos

Aires: Edicion Argentina, 1945), pp.

90-93.

45Arturo Capdevila, "Primera presidencia de Yrigoyen," Historia Argentina
contemperanea 1862-1930, Armando Braun Menendez et al. (Buenos Aires: EI Ateneo,
1964), Cap(tulo XV, pp. 255-6. Also see Rodolfo Puiggros, Historia de los partidos
pol(ticos Argentinas (Buenos Aires: Editorial Argumentos, 1965), pp. 143-44.

26

46Escobar/ pp. 470-71.
47Rennie/ p. 214.
48Galvez, p. 337.
49Escobar/ pp. 495-96.
50Manuel Goldstraj r Arios y Errores (Un cuarto de siglo de pol(tica Argentina)
(Buenos Aires: Editorial Sophos, 1957), p. 65.
51Etchepareborda, "Aspectos," p. 22.
52Del Mazo, Notas, p. 33.
53Galvez, p. 380.
54Roberto Etchepareborda, ltla segundo presidencia de Hip&lito Yrigoyen/"
Historia Argentino contemperanea 1862-1930, Armando Broun Menendez/ et 01.
(Buenos Aires: EI Ateneo, 1964), Capitulo XVII, pp. 350-53.
55Etchepareborda, "Aspectos, II p. 23.

56S now1 p. 42.
57Etchepareborda, "Aspectos, II pp. 24-25.
58S now / p. 43.
59Luis Alberto Romero, et 01., EI Radicalismo (Buenos Aires: Carlos Perez,
Editor, 1968), p. 114.
60Goldstraj, p. 62.
61Etchepareborda, "Aspectos/" p. 26.
62 Department of State Fi I es, 835.00/431, Robert Woods Bliss to the Secretary
of State, March 6 1 1928. (Hereafter D.S.FJ
63Etchepareborda, "Aspectos/II pp. 27-28. Also see Republica Argentina,
Mi nisterio del Interior, Subsecretarra de lnformaciones. Las Fuerzas Armadas
Restitu en el im erio de 10 soberania popular: los electiones generales de 1946 1
Vol. I and II (Buenos Aires: lmprenta e 10 Camara e Diputados, 1946 , pp. 426-33.

6~tchepareborda, Historia, pp. 427-33.

CHAPTER II

1928 - SEPTEMBER 6,

1930

Hipolito Irigoyen was born on July 12 or 13, 1852.

His father, a French

Basque, who groomed horses, married the daughter of his patron, Alem, a mem
ber of a prominent family that was allied with the dictator Rosas.

Shortly after

HipOlito's birth, Rosas was overthrown and Leandro Alem, HipOlito's grandfather,
WllS

executed.
Hipolito soon learned what daily toi I was.

But the family was not poor.

HipOlito's brothers and sisters--Roque, Martin, Amalia and Marcelina--went to
school.

HipOlito was guided by his uncle, Leandro Alem.

eventually entering the university to earn a law degree.

He went to school,
Although he assumed

the title of Doctor, there is no evidence that the degree was ever conferred upon
him.
In 1872 his political career began: due to Alem's influence, he was appointed
police commissioner of one of Buenos Aires' central parishes.

He was respected

in spite of his youth.

In 1877 he was fraudulently elected to the Buenos Aires

Province legislature.

But an election scandal erupted and Irigoyen was denied

the seat.

In 1880 Hipolito became fully immersed in politics.

President Avella

neda appointed him to the post of Administrator of Patents and Stampsi which he
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held from July to September.

In September he was elected to the Chamber of

Deputies where he rarely took part in debates, but when he did his word was
respected, as he was always precise, concrete, and well versed.

His term

ended i n January, 1882. 1
While still a Deputy he was named professor of philosophy and Argentine
History to a women's normal school, and maintained this position until 1890.
He utilized his free time working with his brother Roque, making a fortune in
land and cattle, and learning philosophy.2
He became a disciple of the German philosopher, Karl Christian Friedrich
Krause (1781-1832). 3

Krause, although obscure in Germany and in the English

speaking world, became quite popular in Spain and in Latin America in the latter
port of the nineteenth century.
The doctrine of Krause that lrigoyen adopted was eclectic, mixed with
rationalhm, idealism, and spiritualism.

Krause tried to reconcile the idea of

God, as made known to man through his faith and inner conscience, with the
idea of the world, as known to man through his physical senses.

He argued that

God, as known intuitively through conscience, is not a personality, which em
braces the universe within itself. 4

The world and humanity are universal and

idealistic, the world and mankind being integral parts of the univeise, which is
a divine organism.

The process of development is through the formation of ever

larger groups of people.

First there is man alone, then the family, then small

groups of people, nalions, and then an ultimate stage where the world is one,
which identifies the world with God.

This development, according to Krause,
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is Right or the perfect divine law. 5

Following this, Krause stated that the

individual mind is part of the Universal mind; the inner self is the source of
all knowledge, being in contact with God; the objective of religion is to unite
oneself with God; and the ultimate goal of ethics is to do good for good's sake
alone..

Under these principles, self-realization will lead eventually to the re

alization of God.

Apparently Irigoyen felt he had reached this realization. 6

Krause's philosophy is highly metaphysical and mystical and difficult to
follow.

This difficulty is increased, even for Germans, by the use of abstract,

artificial terminology and Germanicized foreign words, which are unintelligible
to those who have not studied his philosophy.

Irigoyen consistently made use of

this artificial, unintelligible terminology in his messages to Congress and in other
State papers after he became President.

He was especially fond of abstract

plurals and meaningless words, which he made up himself. 7
Krause believed that God manifests Himself on the human plane through all
mankind.

This leads to the concept of democratic equality among men and nations,

universal law and right, perpetual peace until the world is one.

Irigoyen adopted

this and incorporated it into his private and public life after 1884.

He believed

in absolute justice for all men and nations, and in universal peace.

During his

first administration this caused him to stay out of the First World War, and to with
draw from the League of Nations when Germany was not admitted.

8

In his private life, except for a weakness for women, lrigoyen was a perfect
follower of Krause.

He wore the somber clothes affected by Krause and his follow

ers, never laughed, bore himself solemnly, and spoke in a high moral tone, even
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though much of what he said was not intelligible. 9

Men and women, especially

from the lower classes, left his presence transfixed, feeling that he was a saint. 10
During these years of philosophical studies and meditation, Irigoyen con
fronted that ever-pressing question, IIWho am I?
mission in Life?1I

Why am I here?

What is my

Irigoyen concluded that he was in direct touch with God and

that God was guiding him. 11
Irigoyen maintained a frugal life in spite of his fortune.
simple and always aesthetic.

His pleasures were

He had little faith in technical advances.

was generous in his Jove, especially toward the poor and humble.
public salary to charity. 12
of deriving conclusions.

He

He gave his

Spiritualism and divination were part of his method
His memory for nomes, faces, all kinds of details, facts

and opi nions was fantastic--he never forgot a thi ng.

He spoke not to crowds but

to individuals, whom he could captivate, as he could quickly interpret their sen
timents intuitively.

In this lrigoyen was a moster--on a personal basis he was

brilliant. 13
At 76, Irigoyen was in as good health as could be expected, but many political
observers felt, as proved to be true, that his gravest enemy was his age. 14
Ju Iy, 1929, the Uni ted States Ambassador Robert Woods BI iss reported:

By

"I have

learned so many details of his daily doings and manner of thought that there is
little doubt in my mind that Dr. Irigoyen is suffering from incipient cerebral de
generation and is gradually becoming unfit to discharge the duties of his office. 1115
By October he reported that lrigoyen had suffered from bladder and heart attacks. 16
From that time until September 6, Irigoyen suffered from various ailments.

The
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combination of failing health and coming senility, coupled with Irigoyen's
philosophy of politics and government, made his second administration porticu
larly inert and incompetent.
The landslide victory of 1928 had been interpreted by lrigoyen as a complete
mandate or plebiscite to implement programs for the people.

During his First ad

ministration he had already expressed his opinion that he was not an ordinary
executive.

After the 1928 election he said to a friend:

govern with or without the constitution. ,,17

"Now we are able to

Irigoyen's will had been inculcated

in the multitude and proclaimed over the constitution.

Unfortunately, lrigoyen

had concluded (or divined) that in him was the spirit of the people and his actions
were clearly for their benefit.

Any opposition to Irigoyen meant opposition to

the people--hence it was immoral.
By 1929 almost half of Argentina's population was concentrated in the city
and province of Buenos Aires.

The urban population was rising rapidly.

But

industrial development was not satisfactorily absorbing the available labor at
decent wages. 18
The common 'aborer in Buenos Aires earned barely sufficient money to live on.
The average Fami Iy of four lived ina one-room dwelling without plumbing.

Food

and rent took 61 per cent of the worker's average monthly paycheck of 170 pesos.
He earned so little that it was almost impossible to save.

But the laborer in Buenos

Aires experienced a higher standard of living than the agricultural worker. 19
Neither belonged to an effective union.

Because of intense competition For jobs,

'abor was not effedively organized, although strikes and labor troubles were
frequent. 20
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The laborers looked to Irigoyen to eliminate the inequities they were
experiencing.

They did not want a revolution.

living and dignity.21

They wanted only a decent

But to the capitalistic interests, Irigoyen's goals of

political, social and economic transformation of the nation were revolutionary. 22
lrigoyen wanted to narrow the cleavage between the landowner and working
man as much as his power would permit.

Enacting a minimum wage and project

ing a law to compel large landholders to break up their holdings were the main
proposals lrigoyen espoused to accomplish this leveling. 23
did not have a program for elevating the masses.

Unfortunately, Irigoyen

He merely asked Congress to en

act the measures which had been rejected during his first term.
Instead of implementing any coherent program, lrigoyen turned his attention
to morality in his government.

He had been shaken by the dishonesty and graft of

his first term and was determined to prevent it now.
Minister that he (lrigoyen) was

Irigoyen told the Swedish

all alone in trying to prevent corruption and he

could depend upon no one in his government. 24

Irigoyen became so obsessed with

the idea of preventing corruption on the part of his subordinates that he attempted
to examine every voucher, even though all were approved by cabinet members.

As

a result I the number of vouchers awaiting signatures reached almost hopeless pro
portions. 25

This situation was extremely grave, as the Constitution forbade the

enactment of any vouchers without the President's signature.

During c normal day

the President would spend several hours signing vouchers--to read them would be a
physical impossibi lity. 26

Now Irigoyen1s insistence upon moral ity in government

became more damaging than the corruption and graft that had accompanied his first
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term.

As a railroad executive said, ICDoctrinaires of clean government are

expensive to deal with.

In the long run the currupt politician is better for the

country because he gets things done, though sometimes the wrongones--the
honest one stalls everything. 1127
The structure of Argentina's political system permitted the executive branch
to dominate the legislature.

Congress looked to Irigoyen to initiate legislation.

But lrigoyen disliked congressional activity and ordered the U.C.R. Deputies and
Senators to employ obstructional tactics. 28

Although not specifically allowed

by the Constitution, the President actually decreed laws that governed the nation,
without consulting Congress.

Since the Presidential decrees had the substance

of legislation, the President was a lawmaker on the basis of his own judgment.
placate Congress some type of legislative approval was sought.

To

Sometimes this

might take up to ten years, as was the case with the Yacimentos Petroliferos
Fiscales. 29
elastic.

The executive's defiance of the Constitution was also regarded as

Often the congressmen who denounced executive defiance would vote

for legislation prohibited by the Constitution when it was in their interests.

The

courts would seldom declare a law unconstitutional. 30
The executive had broad budgetary powers.

If the legislature did not pass

a budget for any given year, the President could adjourn Congress and decree a
budget.

Alvear did this in 1926 when the Congress would not approve his budget. 31

He also could authorize other expenditures without congressional approval. 32
In addition to these legislative powers, the President had wide appointive powers.
Except for the federal judges, foreign ministers, certain high officers of the Army and
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Navy, and high ranking ecclesiastics, the Senate had no authority to approve
his appointments. 33

The President could, and lrigoyen did, dismiss

as many civil servants as he desired and hire whomever he chose in their place.
It was an unqualified spoils system. 34
With such broad powers vested in the executi ve I it was essenti 01 that the
President be well informed, but Irigoyen was isolated from the public by his
ministers and other intimates.

Irigoyen's personal secretary, Benevides, suc

cessfully extracted money from some Senators, Deputies, Provincial Governors,
and other important politiciaAs before he would permit them to see Irigoyen.
Benevides effectively barred others, who had disturbing information, from seeing
the President. 35

Irigoyen increased his isolation by not permitting his ministers

to dine at any diplomat's house lest they might meet their political opponents. 36
lrigoyen had few intimates whom he consulted and generally reached decisions
independently. 37
Because the presidential powers were so vast, it was essential that lrigoyen's
cabinet work as a team, supplying him with the information needed to run the
nation. 38

lrigoyen chose his ministers on a political basis.

They were ambitious,

obscure, lacking in chamcter and intelligence, but worse, incompetent.
pletely dominated them. 39

He com

Irigoyen attempted to administer all of the insignifi

cant details that were assigned to the ministers.

It was notorious that the minis

ters had no authority and could not take action without lrigoyen's express approval.
lrigoyen would often bypass them and give orders to undersecretaries. 4O

Instead

of supplying Irigoyen with information, the ministers merely carried out his wishes. 41

35

Furthermore, Irigoyen's ministers realized that because of his health he
would probably not finish his term.

Elpidio Gonzalez (Vice President under

Alvear), the Minister of Interior, and Horacio Oyhanarte, the Minister of
Foreign Affairs and Worship, were competing to gain sufficient strength to step
into the Presidency.

By November, 1929, the fight was sa bitter that neither

would speak to the other.
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This infi ghting furthered hampered the executive's

ability to conduct the affairs of state.
The lack of presidential leadership in all of these areas prompted the
United States Ambassador Bliss to write:
The more I seek the cause of the discontent and unrest, the
more evident it becomes that the situation is primarily the
result of the inertia of the National Government, due in
turn to the apparent increasing inabIlity of the President to
direct th~ affairs of state over which he maintains complete
control. 3
Argentina withstood the crisis of 1929 with remarkable stabi lity during
Irigoyen1s administration.

Although the depression produced a reduction in ex

ports, it did not cause comprehensive bank and business failures or unemployment.
What financial difficulties the nation experienced were due more to the adminis
tration1s nonpayment of funds than to the effects of any world-wide financial crisis.
A favorable balance of trade had existed throughout the 1920 l s, and was at
its peak from 1926-1929:
Year
Exports
Imports
Export surplus

1925-26

1926-27

1927-28

1928-29

1929-30

792.50
744.70

960.95
816.60

1,048.90
843.50

1,001.05
881.70

661.30
773.90

47.80

144.35

205.40

119.35

-117.60

Figures in millions of gold pesos.
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Foreign investment also grew during this period.

Although large amounts of

British capitol left Argentino during the First World War, British investment rose
from 1,861 to 2, 140 million dollars from 1919 to 1929.

United States invest

ment rose from 40 to 611 million dollars during the some period. 45

The United

States invested more money in Argentino than in any other Latin American country
except Cuba. 46
Credit was easily obtained from bonds and loons in New York, london, and
in Europe.

The Ce"dula, a bond issued exclusively in Argentine currency against

the security of form land as collaterial, became especially popular in Belgium and
Holland.

Circulation rose from 620 million pesos in 1920 to 1,429 million pesos

in 1929. 47

The government hod no trouble floating loans at high rates of interest

during these some years.

loons coming from New York totaled 220 mi Ilion dollars

between 1925 and 1928.

Their price averaged 98.5 with on overage yield of 6. 1. 48

Because of economic strength based on export surpluses, abundant foreign in
vestment, and because of the ease of obtaining foreign loons, the Caia de Con
versi6n (conversion office) was reopened in August, 1927.
it hod been open since 1919.

Paper money was effectively put on parity with the

gold peso and wcs freely converted to gold.
was hailed as

0

This was the first time

In london and New York the move

sign of the nation IS soundness and prosperity.

The paper peso was

backed by a gold reserve of 78 per cent and gold deposits at the Caia de Conversitn
increased. 49
But world prosperity did not lost.
began to flow out of the countr)'.

By mid-1929 gold stopped coming in and

Throughout the 20's when there were export sur

pluses, bonk reserves increased, credit expanded and imports were stimulated.

But
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in 1928-29, when exports began decreasing, imports did not. 50
investments began to decline, gold began to be exported.

When foreign

One hundred thirty

million gold pesos were exported during the last seven months of 1929.
Most of this was withdrawn from banks and did not restrict the currency, but
by December it became clear that additional withdrawals would have to be taken
from the Caia de Conversitn, which would mean a certain constriction of currency
and credit.
According to classic economics, the Caja de Conversiori should have been left
open and the situation would have cured itself, by drying up credit, currency and
imports.
ment.

It would also have meant a certain depression and widespread unemploy
lrigoyen chose to follow the unorthodox role of closing the Caja de Con

version on December 17, 1929.

He stated.

Considering: that the state of insecurity in the regularity and
stabi lity of the currencies of the principal financial centers of
the world adversely affect our own, giving rise to unjustified
shipment abroad of gold. It is appropriate to close the Caia
de ConversiO'n. 51
In closing the Caia de Conversio'n, payments in gold were suspended
Argentina was effectively taken off the gold standard. 52
If the peso had been kept at par with the gold currencies it would have had
much more disastrous effects than Irigoyen's policy.

As Harold Eo Peters wrote:

That Argentina suffered so little from the world depression,
in spite of the fact that the country produces those commodities
whose values were most seriously affected by price, must be at
least in part attributed to the behavior of the peso. 53
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The tolerobly constant price level and the freedom from serious banking
difficulties in spite of the almost complete lack of a system were also attributed
to the suspension of the gold standard. 54
In the first half of 1930, exports dropped and the peso declined spectacularly. 55
But the national credit did nat suffer severely; Argentine bonds were still quoted
in the nineties in New York.

By mid-1930 the administration needed a short-

term loan to meet obligations.

In April 1930 a six-month loan for 50 million

dollars was obtained in New York, and in June a five million pound loan was se
cured in london.
loans. 56

Both were at slightly higher prices than the last long-term

The government also re jected several other Ameri can offers. 57

The economy's strength was reflected in government revenues.

They increased

from 319 mi Ilion gold pesos in 1928 to 324 mi Ilion in 1930 without a revision of the
tax base. 58
A serious handicap of the budget was that Irigoyen did not thoroughly revise
it.

In fact the budget introduced in 1930 was essentially the same as the 1913

budget.

During the whole period of Radical government there was never a thorough

revision of the budget. 59
January of 1930.

Also, Irigoyen did not submit the 1929 budget unti I

Although such lax procedures were not uncommon, they were

. Ior Iy capricIOUS
.""
f he wor Id economic
,.
. 60
partlcu
I n Ig htot
cnsls.
Before Irigoyen's inauguration business interests were quite dissatisfied,

Their

attitude changed when lrigoyen made his good intentions known by consul ting with
the leaders of the grain interests, packing houses, and railroads about their individ
ual problems. 61
unions. 62

He also attempted to keep turbulent elements from dominating the
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But businessmen's nascent confidence in Irigoyen was soon alienated by the
dock strike at Rosario and delayed payments of government contracts.
The Rosario dock workers struck in July, 1929.
munists, demanded excessive concessions.

The workers, led by Com

As the stri ke dragged on it became

increasingly damaging as Rosario was the largest grain port in Argentina.
four months lrigoyen threatened a restraining order against the workers.
munist leaders flaunted this threat.
to break the strike.

After
The Com

Irigoyen was so incensed that he sent troops

But the strike had lasted long enough to hurt exports. 63

Far more serious than any strike was Irigoyen's policy of reviewing every con
tract in detail before affixing his signature.

The failure of the government to pay

many of its important debts, both foreign and domestic, was a prime example of
administrative inertia.

lrigoyen had to authori ze payment for all government

debts and approve a II busi ness contracts.
The Treasury had large balances from customs at mid-1929 when the government's
failure to pay debts became noticeable.

Irigoyen gave a reason for the government's

failure to pay debts promptly when he said that he would not approve payment of
debts until he was satisfied that there were no irregularities in contracts made dur
ing Alvear's administration. 64

In March 1929 an American commercial representa

tive had an account of one-half million pesos overdue.

Lack of presidential authori

zation, rather than lack of funds, was responsible for failure to make payments
promptly.65
Many of the contractors who held public works contracts had to suspend their
work for lack of funds.

This happened at the Campo de Mayo where the conscripts

were sleeping on boards as barracks construction had stopped. 66
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By far the most embarrassing incident, resulting from fai lure to pay debts
promptly, involved the delivery of two ships from English shipyards.

When the

Argentine crews arrived to take charge of the ships, the shipbuilders refused to
turn over the vessels unti I payment had been made.

The sai lors were reduced

to roaming the streets of Cowes, at the mercy of the local inhabitants as they
had not been given port dues.

The government also failed to meet its payrolls.

From mid-1929 unti I the government's overthrow, payrolls were behind. 67
It is not surprising that public confidence was shaken.

There was no valid

excuse for Irigoyen's failure to sign contracts and his government's failure to pay
its debts.

Several reputable businesses were forced into bankruptcy and many

others were brought to the verge of it.

The United States Ambassador attributed

the outflow of capital and the veering away of foreign investment to lrigoyen's
fai lure to sign important contracts. 68

By October, 1929, the si tuation had reached

a crisis.

The bills that the government owed amounted to over 80 million gold

pesos. 69

The situation improved somewhat in the coming months, but relief was

sporadic and failure to pay loans continued.

When Irigoyen was overthrown on

September 6, 1930, 1, 159 decrees and executive orders were awaiting his signature.
Five hundred twenty seven of these concerned the Ministry vf Public Works, and 560
the MarineJO
Irigoyen saved I-he nation considerable economic hardship in closing the Caia
de Conversio~.

If this had been followed by sensible internal measures, confidence

would have continued.
ment.

Instead, lrigoyen insisted upon having a graft-free govern

His policies did not end graft--rather they undermined the government's

credibi lity.
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The arbitrary nature of lrigoyen's administration was also shown when
thousands of federal civil-service employees were discharged soon after the
presidential inauguration.

In October, 1928, the government revealed its in

tention to purify the civil service of all unnecessary personnel, therebyeffect
ing economies in the executive branch which, it was generally agreed, were
long overdue.

At the time there were thousands of political supporters who had

campaigned for lrigoyen's re-election and it was politically expedient to create
jobs for them in compensation for their services. 71
Early in January the official broom began to sweep through many federal
agencies with swift and decisive strokes.

The first agency affected by the re

duction in personnel was the Ministry of Agriculture, which lost 3,200 employees
in one day.

Since its offices were left with such a small staff, it was impossible

for the Ministry to carry on its normal work.

It reported that even elevator serv

ice was suspended owing to lack of operators. 72

Approximately one thousand

employees of the State Rai Iways were also discharged, as well as several hundred
in the Post Office and Telegraph Department and numerous others in lesser agen
cies.

Employees were released without warning or proper consideration for effi

ciency or seniority. 73
A virtual admission of the administration's error in acting so hastily occurred
shortly after the initial reorganization.

In January, the Minister of the Interior,

Elpidio Gonz61ez, promised protesting delegates of the discharged civil servants
that they would be reemployed owing to the paralysis that had resulted in the
agencies concerned.

The following day agencies such as the Post Office and
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Telegraph Department resolved to take back many of those who had been fired.
But the situation was not rectified.

Later reports indicated that discharges

continued, and in July 1929 several thousands of former government employees
remained unemployed.7 4
The mass of lrigoyen supporters were eager for government employment.
They filled not only the jobs of discharged civil servants but also many unneces
sary positions created for them.75

In September 1930, the Minister of Finance

of the Provisional government, indicated that the employment of these partisan
supporters contributed to excessive spending and the accentuation of budget defi
cits.

He said that after Irigoyen had fired government clerks by the thousands,

allegedly to reduce expenses, he then proceeded to employ three times as many as
had been dismissed. 76
lrigoyen's IJse of his power of appointment with respect to the Consejo Nacional
de Educacion (National Commission of Education) was detrimental to the entire edu
cational system.

In Argentina the management of the educational system centered
I

in the Consejo, which functioned under the auspices of the Ministry of Education.
When lrigoyen took;office, both the president and vice president of the five-member
council resigned.

iAlthough it was Irigoyen's duty to fill these offices, he did not
I

appoint a new president until early in 1929, and he chose to leave the other post
I
!

vacant.

In appoirlting a president, lrigoyen failed to seek the Senate's approval,

violating Public Law 1440, passed in 1884.
lated this law by exceeding his powers.

The Consejo's new president also vio

In an unethical fashion he personally

dominated the Consejo and the district councils of education in such a way that he
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soon controlled the entire educational system.
had occurred since the law of 1884.

It was the first time such a thing

It caused considerable alarm. 77

A principal policy of the Consejo during this period was the establishment
of night schools for adult education and professional and technical schools.
Progress in this field was, however, coupled with an apparent disregard for the
extension and maintenance of many elementary schools.

Many more elementary

schools were needed in areas like Santa Fe' where the Conse jo had reported that
some 80,000 children of school age had no schools to attend. 78

It was increas

ingly evident that the country faced a serious administrative problem.

These

developments contributed to the loss of prestige suffered by the Irigoyen government.
Irigoyen also misused his appointive powers in the judiciary.

His failure to

appoint judges to fill vital federal judicial posts when they became vacant worked
a hardship on the other judges. 79

No apparent reason was given for the President's

failure to appoint a total of twenty-five judges to fill vacancies, but it impeded the
system" for there were not enough judges to attend to all criminal cases and delays
in the settling of civil disputes resulted in all parts of the country.80
In the field of foreign relations Irigoyen failed to maintain adequate diplomatic
representation.

Owi ng to the nature of the economy, cooperation had a Iways been

important to Argentina.

Her economic prosperity depended on imports of foreign

capital and labor as well as the maintenance and development of markets for exports.
This was especially true in the late J920's when nations everywhere were faced with
economic difficulties and the necessity to stimulate markets.

The Irigoyen adminis

tration, however I di d not strengthen the di plomatic and consular corps to meet the
needs of the times but instead allowed it to become ineffective.
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When Irigoyen took office the government announced its intention to
reorganize the diplomatic and consular corps.

The means to be used for this or

the results desired were not indicated but changes occurred rapidly and with a
most detrimental effect. 81

As soon as Irigoyen was inaugurated, the majority

of the Argentine diplomats sent congratulatory messages to the new executive as
a matter of protocol.

These messages remained unanswered.

Then the diplo

matic officials ieceived no salaries, and the government fai led to answer com
munications, some of them of great importance.

Confused by these develop

ments, many diplomats left their posts and returned to Buenos Aires.

Some at

tempted to see Irigoyen to reaffirm their positions, whi Ie others sought new
employment. 82
Undoubtedly the most important post vacated was that of the Argentine
Ambassador to the United States.
the post.

Despite numerous protests lrigoyen never filled

The Argentine embassy in Washington, D,C. remained with only minor

officials in charge, which made it ineffective for carrying out diplomatic duties
at that vital post.

It was noted in September, 1929, that Argentina was the only

nation concerned with the proposed tariff increases in the United States that did
not make a formal protest, but apparently these matters seemed of little concern
to lrigoyen. 83
The recall of the Mexican Ambassador to Argentino in 1929 brought unanimous
criticism from the Buenos Aires press against Irigoyen's fumbli ng foreign policy.
The press interpreted the Mexican move as a result of Argentina's maintaining her
Mexico City Embassy with only a minor offici,,1 in charge for over a year, but
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most Argentine legations and consulates in Central and South American nations
were staffed with minor officials who lacked the necessary rank to perform their
diplomatic duties. 84
By April, 1930, there were nearly forty unemployed Argentine diplomats in
Buenos Aires.

Some had been there over a year. 85

Appointments to diplomatic and consular posts in Argentina were made on the
basis of political influence and friendship, with no strict criterion for training or
competence.
them.

The positions were often regarded as sinecures by those who held

The appointment of Justo A. Suarez, a popular prize fighter, to the post

of Chancellor at the Argentine Consulate General in New York in April, 1929,
caused many disapprovi ng Argentines to fear that their country would lose prestige
as a result.

Suarez had defeated all opponents in his class at home, and it was

expected that he would seek fights in New York while serving in his official ca
pacity at the Consulate.

Among those who protested the appointment was an or

ganization of students and alumni at the diplomatic and consular school at the
University of Buenos Aires.

In a letter to Irigoyen they stated:

nations now appoint only career men to fill consular positions.

liNearly all
Only among us

are consuls sought at ward headquarters and in the prize ring. 1186
Scarcely more than a month before the revolution, Irigoyen finally ordered
all Argentine diplomotic agents at home to return to their posts under penalty of
disciplinary action.

The order was irregular and came too late to repair the

damage that had been caused through almost two years of misdirection in diplomatic
and consular affairs. 87
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President Irigoyen's use of intervention in provincial affairs was of special
significance in his efforts to wrest political power from the hands of opponents
and to steer provincial affairs into the hands of the ~rsonalista Radicals.

He

used intervention to control the four provinces in which the personalistas were
a minority.
Although lrigoyen's intent was to wrest political power from his opponents,
the effect of intervention was to strengthen them.

For the frequency and length

of interventions, together with the events which accompanied them, increased
the opposition's contempt for the entire lrigoyen Administration.
The fi rst of the interventions, occurri ng in the provi nces of San Juan and
Mendoza, were c.aused by institutional subversions which had developed there.
Proposals for federal intervention in these provinces were introduced in Congress
during the 1928 legislative session, and in Mendoza, San Juan, and the federal
capital, public opinion of all but the Anti-Personalisto sectors favored the proposed
federal action. 88

The legislation calling for reorganization of the legislative,

executive, and judicial branches of government in the provinces was approved
with little opposition in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. 89
The legis!ature of San Juan was guilty of approving tyrannical laws, the
executive power had acted dictatorially, and the security of property had dis
appeared.

Freedom of assembly and the right to express opinions had also been

suppressed. 90
San Juan.

The causes for intervention in Mendoza were similar to those in

Carlos Washington Lencinas, national senator from Mendoza and

leader of the Partido Lencinista, an Anti-Personalista Radical party, had become
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the provi ncial caudillo.

The Governor was merely a figurehead, and the

legislature was not in operation.

During the recent elections, the lencinistas

had committed fraud and had subsequently forced all opposition organizations
to close their offices. 91
San Juan had long been the scene of stormy political affairs, which had
not met with the approval of national governments.

Since 1916 the brothers

Federico and Aldo Cantoni had been important figures in the government of the
province.

They helped to maintain a spirit of lowlessness, which had charac

terized the province since early national days.

Federico Cantoni, a former

Socialist, was a supporter of Irigoyen in 1916.

In the mid-twenties the Cantonis

split with the U.C.R. and founded their own party.

When Federico Cantoni be

came Governor in 1923 he followed a plan of using his power to enrich the
fami Iy. 92

There were three interventions in San Juan from the time he became.

Governor to the congressional action in 1928, but each time the Cantonis retained
their power.

With the 1928 triumph in other parts of the nation, however, the

personalistas in San Juan began to agitate against the Cantonis' regime, which
had brought the province to a state of extreme corruption by the time of the 1928
intervention. 93

Modesti no A. Pizarro, federal i nterventor I stated that upon ar

rival in the province in December, 1928, he was convinced that the solution to
problems there involved much more than the reorganization of the three branches of
government.

He noticed a general state of fear and distrust owing to the caudillo's

maintenance of a well-developed espionage system for securing information about
political enemies.

He also noted that the more educated had withdrawn from

society, and a climate of immorality seemed to dominate the province.

Gambling,

although illegal, was very popular and openly sanctioned by the authorities for
those who contributed to the official political organization. 94
Undoubtedly, the most flagrant example of government-encouraged immorality
was the institution of government-agency parties.

Women employees were organized

into political clubs which periodically held parties for the entertainment of male
government officials and other supporters of Governor Cantoni.

These functions

were true orgies, which the women were forced to attend under threat of losing
their jobs.

One of the first acts of the intervention was to isolate many women for

treatment of venereal diseases and rehabilitation lito protect the public health and
morality of the province. 1195

Upon assuming his duties, Pizarro found the pro

vincial treasury empty, and the economy in a depressed condition.

Pizarro wrote

that it was the custom in most provinces experiencing intervention for the deposed
governments to leave financial matters in the best condition possible to give the
interventors a favorable impression of their administrations. 96

This was not the

case in San Juan, however, as he left little doubt that the cantonistas stuffed
their pockets before vacating their offices. 97

They left behind them a total public

debt of over twelve and one-half million pesos.

The interventor acted as soon as

possible to reduce expenses and to decrease the debt. 98
Although the Lencinas family had not enjoyed political control as long as the
Cantoni brothers, the Lencinista Anti-Personalist Radicals had the largest single
following of any political group in the province.

Lencinas was able to maintain

his power because the opposition Liberals and Radical Personalistas had not formed
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a united front against his authoritarianism.

In the 1928 election the opposition

groups received more votes collectively than Lencinas; but because they were
irreconcilably disunited in the election, they were forced to accept the caudillo
again as victor. 99
In Mendoza the personalista interventor, Carlos Borzani, found it especially
difficult for personalistas to win in elections.

This was owing not only to opposi

tion disunity, but also to the great popularity of Lencinas among the rural people
of their rural areas. 100
To the rural people Lencinas was more than a political leader.

He had lived

among the people for years, helping and defending them in time of trouble.

He

took part in their social activities and acted as godfather for an innumerable number
of their children.

As he had alwa.ys been close to the rural populace, his strength

rested in the country rather than the cities.

The federal agents felt that without

Lencinas his party would fall apart, since it was his own spirit and leadership that
won support and strength for the organization.
open to question.

La Nacion felt that this belief was

It stated that if the party were deprived of its leader, whose

popularity approached idolatry, he might well become a martyr to his many followers,
compl icati ng matters even more. 101
The intervention in the provinces of Santa Fe' and Corrientes, which followed in
Apri I, 1929, resulted from presidential decree rather than from congressional law,
unlike the interventions in San Juan and Mendoza.

Irigoyen's decision to reorganize
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the legislative and judicial branches of the government in Santa Fe was the
result of political turmoil which had plagued that province for some time. 102
Unable to cope with an uncooperative turbulent legislature and an in
fluential Rosario caudillo, the Governor of Santa Fe, a personalista, had
closed the legislature ten months earlier and was making all decisions himself.

It was not surprising that an intervention should be called, since the federal
government had sent repeated warnings that such wou Id result if a republican
form of government were not reestabl ished.

It was also significant that the

Rosario caudillo, who was attempting to force his will on the Governor, was
not sympathetic to Irigoyen administration.
lrigoyen decreed the intervention of Corrientes with that of Santa Fl.
He stated: liThe province of Corrientes exists in a state of profound disargani
zation owing to the arbitrariness of a government whose irregular activities
make for a complete negation of the representative republican system. ,,103
The decree stated that the regime was maintained by fraud and oppression.

It

mentioned the lack of securities for free political expression and lack of safe
guards for the freedom and security of the individual.

It was also claimed that

the legislature did not reflect the will of the electorate, and some vague remarks
were made concerning irregularities in the judiciary. 104
In answer to these charges, the opposition press reported that the action was
taken primarily for political reasons.

In its eyes the only purpose for such a move

was to dislodge a well-established political organization that opposed Irigoyen.
It was pointed out that the three branches of government had operated peacefully
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and with regularity.

The matter was not of such seriousness that it required an

intervention, and the least the President could have done was to have waited
for Congress to decide the case through congressional investigation. 105
As the winter months passed, new developments in the interventions in San
Juan and Mendoza brought protests from the deposed authorities and the opposi
tion in Buenos Aires.

From Mendoza came a declaration from the Lencinista

Anti -Personalist Radical party to President Irigoyen, citing numerous abuses
suffered by their members at the hands of intervention authorities.

They com

plained that they had been deprived of their freedom of assembly and that arrests
without cause had become a dai Iy occurrence.

In anticipation of future elec

tions, libretas de enrolamiento, or registration cards, had been seized from their
members, thus depriving them of the right to vote.

Complaints were also made

concerning the conduct of judges, appointed by intervention authorities.

It was

asserted that they were irresponsible and used their positions to damage reputations
rather than to set a good example for other provincial judges. 106

It was natural to expect complaints from the displaced leaders, but charges
that Modestino Pizarro was using his position and facilities to persecute them and
their followers rather than to carry out his accepted functions raised new issues. 107
Also, the work to revise the government was delayed.

The opposition press

of Buenos Aires interpreted the delay as an intentional plan to maintain federal
control in San Juan.

As for as that element of the press was concerned, the inter

ventor had confined his activities to distributing jobs to Radical Personalistas from
Buenos Aires. 108

It seemed that the government was attempting to prolong the
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occupation long enough to break down the opposition's strength and to make
possible the election of the Radical Personalistas at an opportune time. 109
In the post it was not uncommon for federal authorities to precipitate or
maintain interventions through their own supporters in order to abolish undesirable
provincial governments and to assure the establishment of governments more favor
able to their own. 110

In his book, interventor Modestino Pizarro gives an in

dication that this might well have been the case in San Juan. 111
Maintaining the intervention until they could be sure of winning the election
would benefit irigoyen's supporters.

It was also to the advantage of the Radical

government to maintain its control there, since it provided employment for its
partisans from Buenos Aires.

In their search for explanations of the federal govern

mentis prolonged action in San Juan and Mendoza, the cantonistas and lecincistas
used these reasons, among others, in their arguments that the rf:al purposes of inter
vention were not being fulfilled. 112
In view of the apparent haste with which the President acted to decree inter
ventions in Santa Fe and Corrientes before Congress opened, it was surprising that
noth i ng had been done by August to enforce the decrees.

Interventors were not

sent to the provinces nor was Congress given any official report on conditions that
would have prompted such a decree or its nonfulfillment. 113
In the meantime, the Governor of Corrientes, in accordance with the provincial
constitution, decreed that the regular election for Governor and Vice-Governor
would soon be held.

It was assured that all parties would be guaranteed ample
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freedom in their election campaigns.

This was affirmed by the opposition's

belief that no intervention was needed in Corrientes. 114
One of the most unfortunate incidents of the interventions and the one
stimulating the greatest wave of protest in 1929 was the murder of Carlos Wash
ington lenci nas.

In November, lenci nas was ordered by warrant to return from

Buenos Aires to Mendoza.

Despite orders from police that there were to be no

public demonstrations or meetings when the caudillo arrived, an estimated five
thousand persons were on hand to greet him.

lencinas, white listening to a

speech, was killed by a shot fired from the crowd.

Since the police in attend

ance were allegedly unarmed and would not interfere until a skirmish began,
pandemonium broke out with considerable gun play. 115
Intervention authorities were satisfied with the explanation that the slaying
was the result of a personal grudge and the assassin had been killed in the fray.
The untimely death of the popular Lencinas caused a wave of protest throughout
the republic.

It was evident to the opposition that the real responsibility for the

crime lay squarely with the federal agents who did not give Lencinas proper
protection. 116

Shortly after the murder it was revealed that the caudillo sent

a dispatch to lrigoyen twenty-four hours before his death in which he said, "You
should adopt the means .•• to prevent any violence if you do not want to assume
the responsibility ... for the events which might occur in Mendoza upon my
arrival. 11117
Publi c opi nion became so aroused that forma I protests and organi zed meetings
were staged to bring an end to the intervention.

A Socialist declaration stated
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that the extension of the intervention, wi thout any other end than the tri umph
of the governing party, had contributed to creating an atmosphere favorable to
such manifestations of political barbarism. 118
A meeting of the conservative block of the Chamber of Deputies resulted in
a resolution stating that regardless of the direct legal responsibility for the crime,
the true guilt belonged entirely to lrigoyen and his agents in Mendoza. 119
As Congress was in special session, debates focused on the intervention in
Mendoza.

The opposition majority in the Senate ordered the interpellation of the

Minister of the Interior, Elpidio Gonzalez.

The President of the Senate and Per

sonalista Vice-President of the republic, Enrique Mart(nez, was asked to deliver
the reso Iution. 120
In full violation of his duty, Martrnez failed to communicate the resolution
because he did not approve of it.

In explaining his action to the Senate the fol

lowing day I he made a brief reference to the gravity of such a proposal, saying
that for this reason he felt it his duty not to comply with the order. 121

Bitter

arguments were followed by a report on the matter from the Senate Committee on
Constitutional Affairs.

The report stated emphatically that Martinez had erred in

not carrying out the will of the Senate's majority. 122

The Senate again approved

the resolution, but, although it was delivered to the executive branch, there was
no reply.
Faced with lack of cooperation by the personalistas' majority of the Chamber
of Deputies, in obtaining an official report on conditions in San Juan and Mendoza,
a group of seven Deputies of the opposition parties went to those provinces to
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investigate conditions for the benefit of the Congress.

In mi d-December they

reported that the laws of intervention were not being carried out in the manner
intended by Congress, and they indicated that the functionaries appointed to
fill judicial and other posts were a major weakness of the interventions.

The

judges were incompetent to dispense justice, and the police appointees were
persons of undesirable backgrounds who used violent methods in carrying out
their work.

They concluded their report with the comment that only by return

ing those provinces to a state of autonomy could order be restored. 123
Another significant development during the special session of the Congress
was the enforcement of the President's decree of intervention for Corrientes.
Th is occurred in late November, 1929.
in full violation of the Constitution.

In the case of Corrientes, the act was

The Senate had refused congressional pro

posal far intervention, and the President was not allowed 1"0 act while the Con
gress was in session. 124
In the wake of the enforcement of the Santa Fe intervention, in January,
1930, came the long-awaited announcement that the elections to end the inter
ventions in San Juan and Mendoza would be held in March.
Personalistas in these provinces affirmed that they would be sufficiently united
to elect their candidates in the election, but on the whole there was little enthusiasm
over the government's announcement.

The opposition did not believe that the gov

ernment would keep its promise and believed that the election would be delayed. 125
Months passed, conditions remained unchanged, and, as many had expected, the in
tervention elections were not held.

In mid-June, however, the President issued a
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decree stating that the interventions in San Juan and Mendoza would end after
elections were held in those provinces on September 6.
by the personalistas and opposition alike.

This news was welcomed

For the former it meant that the per

sonalista group in the provinces was sufficiently united to win in an election, and
for the latter it meant the chance for autonomy and freedom from the oppressive
i nterventors. 126
The enthusiasm expressed by the opposition was short lived.

The Electoral

Commission of San Juan ruled that women would not be permitted to vote.

Al

though women did not vote in any other province of the republic, those of San
Juan had enjoyed the privilege since 1927.
The Commission claimed that Part I, Article 8, of the Federal Constitution
gave them the right to prevent women from voting:

" ••• the citizens of each

province shall enjoy all rights, privneges, and immunities inherent in the title
of citizens in the others. II

Since women did not vote in any other province,

the Commission decided that they could not vote in San Juan.

(If women in

San Juan could vote, women in the other provinces would not be enjoying "all
rights" inherent as citizens of San Juan.) 127
Opposition in both San Juan and the federal Chamber of Deputies claimed that
the Commission's action constituted an abrogation of the provincial constitution
and of local laws.

It was a basic violation of autonomy.

It was also pointed aut

that the judges of the Electoral Commission were narrowly subordinated to the in
tervention to which they owed their appointments and by which they could be removed.
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In San Juan as well as in other provinces this affair was interpreted as proof of
subversion of the Constitution. 128
Worse than the reiection of provincial laws was the increasing subversion of
the Sa'enz Pena law in San Juan.

Confiscation of the libretas de enrolamiento

continued at a greater rate after the March congressional elections than before. 129
The libretas were obtained under false pretenses and then never returned to the
owners.

The contention was that they had been lost or stolen. 130

According

to the Federaci6n Socialista de San Juan, some 14,000 libretas had been taken
that could not be claimed for the upcoming provincial elections. 131
The anticipation of elections in Mendoza was treated in a similar vein.

An

editorial in Lc Prensa stated that they were a joke and no one thought they would
be honest, as nothing had been done to secure civil rights which were indispensable
in a free election. 132
The climax to the developments of this two-year period came during the winter
of 1930.

An election for Governor and provincial legislative representatives was

scheduled in the province of Entre Rios for June 1.

Apparently fearing defeat,

the directors of the Partido Radical Personalista in Entre Rios urged that the Presi
dent decree an immediate intervention.

Since Entre Rios had traditionally resisted

any outside interferences and cherished its au1onomy, this move aroused cons ider
able adverse sentiment in the province, and the President decided in early May that

it would not be undertaken, despite the fact that he had earlier agreed to oblige
with an intervention. 133
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The personafistas of Entre Rios were far from satisfied with the President's
decisi on.

They had not prepared for the election, as they had expected the

federal government to intervene, and when the Anti-Personalistas won a ma
jority of the votes in the election, the personalistas began a campaign which
would ultimately provoke an intervention. 134
According to Entre Rios law, it was necessary for an electoral college to
be selected by the legislature to give the final decision on the electoral re
sults before a new government could begin its work.

If this formality were

not observed before the end of the incumbent administration1s term, the prov
ince would be without a government.

The personalistas were in a position to

prevent the legislature from meeting, as they controlled a majority of seats in
the Senate. 135
Meeting the minority, the Senate adopted a radical means to correct the
situation.

On August 13, they refused the credentials of the non-cooperative

Radical Personalista Senators, and the Governor decreed on December 13 that
the areas from which those Senators came were to elect replacements. 136

This

move raised fears that a federal intervention was soon to come, as personalista
leaders in the federal capital were pressuring the President.

Several days later,

President lrigoyen made the dreaded announcement that intervention would soon
be decreed for Entre Rios. 137

An inflamed and excited opposition held meetings and rallies of protest in
Entre Rios and in other parts of the republic.

President Irigoyen did not state

when the intervention would take place, and there were rumors that he would
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wait to strike until conditions there hod become worse so that it might mean a
full intervention. 138

The Governor of Entre Rios also raised his voice in protest:

••• this attempt to forcefully take over the province in which
the personalistas lost in the election definitely closes the road
of legal ity and opens that of revolution. The national govern
ment seems disposed to do anything. Besides the four thousand
men of the national army who are now stationed in Entre Rios, it
has been announced that even more wi II be sent. It is possible
that in this way they will be able to discourage any threats of
resistance on the part of the people, but it is certain that this
will be the last victory for the Irigoyenistas. 1':!1
Since the intervention did not occur when expected, it seemed for the moment
that the majority of Entre Rios citizens had won their case.

Other action precluded

the need of further apprehension of intervention.
In determi ni ng the importance of the interventions as a cause of the September
revolution, several factors should be considered.

These incursions, in contrast to

those of the previous administration, were not temporary affairs.
became permanent occupations.

Instead, they

lrigoyen was noted for h is frequent use of thi s

power during his first administration, but the average length of those intervensions
was five and one-half months. 140

Such unending control of the very provinces

with governments opposed to the political elements of the national administration
was interpreted by all segments of the opposition as a plan to dominate them in
accord with the petty and c"'nfused interests of the Radical party.
In the realm of propaganda and interpretation, much was said of a contradictory
nature on both sides of the political fence concerning the events and policies of the
interventions.

Regardless of what actually happened in the provinces, an active

opposition made use of every opportunity it had to discredit Irigoyen and the
i nterventors.
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In San Juan, Mendoza, Corrientes and Santa Fe there were valid reasons
for intervention.

There was a need for genuine regeneration to make these

provinces viable democracies, but the interventions were used as a political
tool.

No regeneration took place nor were any of the provinces made more

democratic.

On the contrary the personalistas used the interventions to gain

complete control of those provinces.

For lrigoyen, whose dictum for so long

had been free suffrage, the events that transpired made his government super
ci lious beyond descri ption.
While lri goyen1s aggressive intervention policy was severely criticized, he
was also attacked for his distaste for congressional activity.

He attached little

importance to Congress, as his electoral mandate proved that he was the true
representative of the people.

Also the Congress slowed measures down because

of their incessant debating and arguing.

As the U.C.R. was under lrigoyen's

control, he was able to command them as he saw fit.

His overall policy was to

obstruct congressional acticity and rule by decree.
lrigoyen's attitude was not completely unjustified as the Congress endlessly
held up legislation by debating the most trivial issues.
roadblock.

The Senate was the main

When Irigoyen was inaugurated there were 58 treaties and conventions

awaiting ratification by the Senate that had been pigeonholed for several years. 141
Since the U.C.R. only held 7 seats, while the opposition parties held 19, they were
at the mercy of the majority, 142 and the majority in the Senate, while able to pass
or reject legislation from the lower house, was not receptive to Irigoyen's proposals.
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The first congressional session of Irigoyen's second administration was
scheduled to commence on May 1, 1929.

Congress finally met on May 24.

This was not unusual as in the past 73 sessions Congress had only met four times
on its mandatory opening day of May 1. 143

When Congress convened, Irigoyen

did not present a program for legislation, and he further broke tradition by send
ing the Minister of Interior, Elpidio Gonz~lez, to read his opening message in
stead of presenting it himself.

The message stated: liThe executive has not had

sufficient time to set forth in detail all its intentions regarding the well being of
the nation .•.. II

In the meantime Congress wcs requested to dedicate itself to

the many bills rejected during the years 1916-1922.
to Congress.

Obviously this was insulting

But Irigoyen did not want to share his power. 144

As the Congress had come to depend upon the executive for initiation of
legislation, the 1929 session was particularly unproductive.
regressed to frequent debating.

Also the Congress

The Senate debated for almost two months on the

credentials of the Senators-elect, Carlos Washington Lencinas, Federico Cantoni,
and Carlos Porto, and their credentials were finally rejected. 145

Only three

lows of any importance were passed: Law 11,544 establishing maximum hours of
work for laborers; Law 11,563 ordering a census of the national income; Law 11,570
applying fixed standards for the application of work lows.

Of these lows the first

two had been introduced duri ng lrigoyen's fi rst term. 146
Because so little had been proposed or accomplished during the regular session,
lrigoyen, now apparently willing to share his mandate, decreed a special session to
commence on October 7, 1929, to deal with the'following: the budget, a law
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governing the issue of mortgage bonds, the nationalization of petroleum,
establishment of a national farmers' bank, establishment of fixed agricultural
rents, bonds for paving the streets of Buenos Aires, a highway bill, a public
works bi II, rati flcation of appoi ntments made by the government, and a bank
employees' holiday and pension bill. 147
As in the regular session, politics was an obsession in the special session.
The Senate minority found it necessary to impose a fine to obtain a quorum by
November 19, and the Chamber of Deputies did not meet until December.
The 1929 budget and Law 11,575 establishing bank employees' pensions and
holidays were the only measures passed during the entire session.

However,

the Chamber of Deputies did pass most of Irigoyen's proposals but the Senate
blocked them. 148

Irigoyen, naturally incensed, stated in January of 1930:

"If you (Congress) do not like my legislation then enact that which is better,
but do not go to the nation without assurances and guarantees of appropriate
legislation ... 149

As the session was almost over it was pointless to ask Con

gress to initiate any legislation, let alone pass what it had initiated.
But Irigoyen had othl3r reasons for disliking the congressional, and espe
cially senatorial, activity.

The Senate had insisted upon its right to review

executive acts and interpellate ministers.
had that right.
Court.

lrigoyen denied that the Senate

But the Senate challenged Irigoyen's view before the Supreme

In upholding the Senate's right to review legislation, the Supreme

Court stated:

"The legislative branch is the depositorl of the greatest amount of

power and is .•• the immediate representative of sovereignty. 11150
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lrigoyen put special emphasis on the March 1930 elections for Deputies.
The U.C.R. was determined to gain as many seats as possible by whatever means
necessary.

Unfortunately the U. C. R. committed many fraudulent acts in secur

ing this election. 151

But they were successful in winning 59 of the 90 seats up

for election.
The elecHon was not a genuine victory for the U.C.R., as the fraudulent
procedures caused so much resentment among some party members that they began
criticizing Irigoyen's policies.

They let it be known that they did not approve

of many of the U.C.R.'s candidates or of the violence displayed by their fellow
party members in the elections. 152

Although all members of the U.C.R. were

opposed to the Anti-Personalistas and the conservatives, they divided over purity
in elections and the importance of Congress.
jority of the U.C.R. in line.
was to be impotent. 153

lrigoyen was able to keep a ma

Elections were to be won at all costs and Congress

But this fissure, which had developed inside the ruling

party, pointed to the growing dissatisfaction of Irigoyen's policies and complete
dominance of the party.
Although the U. C. R. was victorious at the polls, Irigoyen had apparently
decided, because of his inability to coerce Congress to pas!> all of his legislation
in the 1929 regular and special sessions l to employ obstructional tactics so Con
gress could not convene.

In doing this he could rule by decree without dissident

personalista Deputies or inquisitive Senators. 154
When the 1930 congressional preliminary sessions began, the U.C.R. used
debating over Deputies' credentials as a means to neutralize Congress.

As the
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U.C. R. controlled the Credentials Committee they accepted all of their Deputy
elects, but rejected four of the opposition IS Deputy-elects.
would not permit the Chamber to form a quorum.

But worse, they

The debates ran on until

September 1, when a quorum was held and the Chamber convened, but it was
too late. 155

The opposition was partly guilty, as they permitted the debates

to lapse into trivia.

One day was wasted arguing over staying on the subject. 156

The Senate, while controlled by the opposition, was as impotent as the
Chamber.

One day the Senate debated the validity of a man's signature. 157

The Senate only held one preliminary session on April 1 until the revolution.
La Prensa was continually criticizing the Congress through August for its nebulous
debates, which were especially damaging in light of the presidential usurpations. 158
lrigoyen preferred to rule by decree than wait for congressional action.

His

most important decrees in 1928 and 1929 were: organizing sanitary controls to in
sure the quality of cereal exports, reduction of export tariffs in Rosario, extending
and improving the railroad networks, construction of a new building for the medical
school, creation of the Instituto de Petroleo, prohibition of iron exports, construc
tion of 1700 schools, intervention with troops and settlement of the strikes in Rosario
and Santa Fe.

lrigoyen's decrees in 1930 were: creation of the Institute of Nutri

tion, subsidizing the Institute of Cancer, imposing a uniform price on gasoline
th roughout the notion, and decree i n9 May 1st as Labor Day. 159
It was obvious that Irigoyen did not have a plan to raise the standards of the
workers.

He left those bills to the Congress, which he had effectively paralyzed.

And in 1930 lrigoyen did not decree anything of importance.
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Although lrigoyen was free to do what he chose, it became apparent that
he did not have a program or plan to guide him, save distributing the spoils of
office and eliminating his opposition.

During 1930, the government decreed

so little and became so vaci Ilating and inept that there was no effective leader
ship in the nati on.

Congress had been effectively checked but not replaced.

With this leadership void, the nation floundered.

A solution had to be found.

The Army ultimately provided the solution to Irigoyen's continued misuse of
power.

The President had caused resentment among the officer corps because

of his irregular and disruptive policies.

While irregular promotions caused wide

spread resentment, lrigoyen also failed to maintain expenditures for mi litary equip
ment.

As the time passed, dissatisfaction increased among the military.

By

August 1930 certain segments of the officer corps were ready to use force to oust
Irigoyen.
Irigoyen viewed the military as a large group or political unit rather than a
hierarchial institution where morale. and discipline are closely interrelated in a
160
set pattern. Because of this, he freely dispensed promotions as political favors
to officers, regardless of their standing for promotion.

Any officer who could

arrange an interview with the President was virtually assured of a promotion. 161
Other forms of political favoritism included: retroactive promotion of retired
officers with retroactive pay {which was contrary to specific provisions of military
law}; reincorpcration of long since discharged officers with full credit for serving
the intervening years; and alternation of the date of the date-of-enlistment of
favored active-duty officers, giving them seniority over their contemporaries, and
an advantage for promotion. 162
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As disturbing as these political favors, was Irigoyen's lack of promotions of
the superior grades and delaying promotions in the field and junior grades of the
military.

The organic military statute called for promotions to be made effec

tive every December 31, and lists were customarily issued around that date.
The promotions of the superior officers (colonels and generals) required the
Senate's approval, which was usually given without difficulty ~

But lrigoyen

did not submit any names to the Senate in 1929, and since the Senate did not sit
in 1930, there were no promotions made during the entire administration.

This

was serious, as the officers who were to be advanced were frustrated in not being
able to make the magic change from field to superior grade officers. 163

And

these officers, lieutenant colonels, who were not promoted, held the regimental
command posts.

Irigoyen delayed approval of the field and iunior grade pro

motions, which annoyed many officers.

The 1928 list was issued in the following

May, and the 1929 list was not issued until after the March elections. 164
lrigoyen reduced military armaments spending from more than 16 million pesos
annually to 137,000 pesos annually, which helped to widen the cleavage between
segments of the officer corps and the administration. 165
was not a single new armaments contract approved.
because of Irigoyen's refusal to sign contracts.

In addition to this, there

Those pending were held up

This practically shut down the air

plane factory in Cordoba and halted the delivery of the two British destroyers. 166
But Irigoyen placed more emphasis upon individuals than upon institutional
strength, more on men than hardware.

A general pay raise was enacted as well

as steps to raise pensions to the level of active pay.

Government outlays for
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pensions rose from 21.6 million pesos in 1928 to 36.1 million in 1929.

Manpower

also increased as conscription was raised from 24,838 men in 1929 to 25 1 098 in

1930.

The enrollment of cadets at the Colegio Militar (Military Academy)

raised from 542 in 1928 to 628 in 1930. 167
Although Irigoyen increased manpower and raised the armed forces I pay 1
his interference in promotions and cutbacks in armaments spending caused grow
ing dissatisfaction among the military.

Increasing numbers of officers came to

believe that Irigoyen was irreparably damaging the institution and that he did
not understand the nation's defense needs. 168

As Irigoyen1s administration

continued its interference in the organic processes of the Army and Navy, the
opposition grew.

It became increasingly evident to those officers opposed to

lrigoyen that the situation would have to change.
The armed forces were sharply divided at the time of Irigoyen's inauguration.
One faction , which had formed the illegal Logia General San Martrn in 1921 1
was opposed to mixing politics in the armed forces.

While Augustfn P. Justo

was War Minister under Alvear, the Logia was able to gain his support.

Officers

who were palitically minded were blacklisted by the Logia and received undesir
able assignments.

By 1926 the Logia was disbanded, as its members felt that they

had accomplished their goals. 169
With lrigoyen's return in 1928 the blacklisted officers gained control of the
War Ministry.

Now officers who had been identified with the Logia were relieved

of their posts and placed in unassigned status.

Eventually many of these officers

were given assignments but others preferred to retire. 170

This group of retired
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and unassigned officers, headed by General Jost F. Uriburu, were to organize
and form the conspiracy which led the revolution of September 6 1 1930.
Opposition to Irigoyen's administration began building in the winter of 1929 1
when the arbitrary nature of the government became apparent.

Non-signing of

vouchers, arbitrary dismissal of public employees, intervention in San Juan,
Mendoza, Corrientes, and Santa Fe, degredation and paralysis of Congress l and
interference in the armed forces provided ample fuel for the opposition's attacks
on Irigoyen's administration.
Opposition centered in political action groups, such as the ten-year-old
right-wing liga Patri6tica Argentina and the similar but more militant liga
Republicana which had been formed to oppose Irigoyen.

By October 1929 the

liga PatriO'tica was conducting vociferous anti -administration street meetings.
lrigoyen's health was affected by these meetings to the point that the Minister
of Foreign Affairs, Horacio B. Oyhanarte l personally requested the leader of
the liga Patridtica to prevent a demonstration. 171
While lrigoyen was intent in intervening in the provinces and interfering in
elections in those provi nces, he never attempted to muzzle the press or inti mi da te
the opposition.

While he had the power to call a state of seige, he never did.

In general he respected the oppositi on's right to free speech and free press. 172
The opposition press was capably led by La Prensa and La NaciO'n l the two
most prominent newspapers in Argentina.

They were continually criticizing

Irigoyen's every move and they left no quarter.

When CarIos Washington len

cinas was assassinated in November of 1929 their campaign against the government

69
began and did not stop until Irigoyen's ouster. 173

The irregularities in the

interventions were continually brought out and lrigoyen was blamed for everything
from university disorders to labor disputes. 174

Although the press was unfairly

critical at times, the iniquities of the government became obvious.
The campaign for the March 1930 election of Deputies was extremely heated.
The opposition cried: liThe specter of dicfatorship is starting to fall upon us. 11175
The confiscation of libretas in San Juan was used to confirm the accusation.
as serious was the violence perpetrated by the U. C. R. in their campaign.

Just
In

Lincoln, a small town in Buenos Aires Province, while the opposition was conduct
ing a rolly, members of the U. C. R. began shooti ng into the crowd from rooftops
and automobiles.
battle.

Two people were killed and several wounded in the ensuing

But that was not the only gunplay, as the members of the U.C.R. were

found shooting at the opposition in Toledo, Olmos, Godoy Cruz and in Buenos
Aires.

Because of their election activities and Il"igoyen's failure to 5atisfy the

electorate, the U. C. R. lost its mandate.

The election results reduced their share

of the vote to 48 per cent. 176
While the votes were being counted, news of electoral scandals broke.

The

worst took place in Cordoba where members of the U.C.R. stole ballot boxes from
a counting place and kidnapped the officials who were to count the ballots.

Even

if the people were freely allowed to vote for whomever they chose, this action
negated the purpose of an election. 177
On the eve of the elections the high officials of the U. C. R. had been as sure
of victory as lrigoyen.

They were completely shocked when they had lost their
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majority in Buenos Aires, which they had maintained for the past 14 years. 178
Apparently the loss of votes in this election was one of the reasons for lrigoyen's
inactivity.
There had been an assossination attempt in December 1929 which prompted
Irigoyen to keep an excessive number of armed guards, which was one of the reasons
for his increased isolation. 179

On election day in March 1930 he stationed well

armed troops around his residence in fear of violence from the opposition.

When

he rode in the presidential limousine he kept the curtains drawn and always had a
motorcycle guard, but this protection turned into isolation from reality.

lrigoyen's

friends convinced him to disregard the opposition press whi Ie they assured him that
he was taking the correct actions.

Those who wanted him to end the misgovernment

were called traitors or dismissed a:; crazy by other intimate friends of the President. 180
The March 1930 elections shocked Irigoyen and he apparently did not understand the
cause of his party's defeat.

He could not cope with his loss of popularity.

Irigoyen's

reaction to the election setbacks was manifested in his refusal to carryon the many
daily functions of his office.

This inactivity lasted from March until August, when

lrigoyen filled several vacancies in the judiciary, authoriz.ed promotions in the armed
forces, and authorized payment of some public works projects in the provinces. 181
But the action was not sufficient to meet the coming crisis.
lrigoyen had governed too long on the margin of legality.

The most obvious

product of his administration was an increase in poliHcal turmoil and corruption of
the democratic procedures. 182
cation of the opposition.

A by-product of his misgovernment was the unifi

Forty-four Deputies from the Independent Socialists,
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Anti-Personalistas, liberal and conservative parties issued

Q

manifesto, on August 9,

that called for: coordinated action in both chambers to force the President into
complying with the Constitution, reopening the Caja de Conversion, and loyally
applying the basic organic laws.

They promised to defend the people against the

illegal presidential acts and to create
take off the fetters. 11183
lrigoyen.

1I • • •

a civic spirit to resist these abuses and

The opposition had begun its final campaign against

The Anti-Personalista and conservative Senators met on August 20 and

signed a manifesto similar to that of the Deputies. 184

Soon prominent people

were asking for Irigoyen's resignation while hinting that if it did not come a revolu
tion was certain. 185
mands for reform.
activities. 18

9

The 44 Deputies met again on August 22 to renew their de

The liga Patri6'tica and the liga Republicana increased their
General Uriburu was coetanousl};" bui Iding support in ~he Army to

I

insure a conspiratorial victory by the use of force.
Although General Uriburu headed the revoluHonary movement there were several
factions within the armed forces that were planning a revolt.

Uriburu successfully

united these factions under his leadership during the first week of September 1930. 187
His original plan had called for a thorough revision of the entire governmental system
based on the corporativist idea. 188

But the other major faction headed by former

War Minister Justo wanted to adhere as closely as possible to the Constitution. 189
This difference of opinion caused numerous delays in planning as the two factions
could not unite.

Both factions wanted to oust Irigoyen but they could not achieve

their ends until they agreed upon unified goals for the revolt.

This meant that the

revolutionary effort was indefinite until this unification could be achieved.
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During the last weeks of August everybody was talking about revolution,
and everyone believed that it was coming, except lrigoyen, who could not con
ceive how anyone could make a revolution against him, the mandatory of the
Argentine electorate.

Apparently his senility had become complete. 190

He

did not want to believe the news of revolutionary activities, and because of
his senile sentimentalism was reluctant to take forceful measures. 191
was told of the revolutionary activities he invariably replied:

When he

"Nothing will

happen; they are just momentary political agitations, a consequence of the last
electoral conflicts.

They wi II soon vanish. 11192

Irigoyen's reluctance to act was particularly frustrating to his War Minister,
General Luis J. Dellepiane.

Since early August he was well informed about

General Uriburu's revolutionary activities through loyal officers who had infil
trated meetings.

The information was transmitted to Elpidio Gonzalez, who re

ceived it with indifference.

On August 22 Dellepiane had received further in

formation that convinced him of the impending revolution.

He sought Irigoyen's

approval for quick action but was met with indifference, even ridicule, by Gon
zalez, Juan de la Campa, the Minister of Justice, and the chief of police of
Buenos Aires, Juan J. Graneros, who ironically attributed Dellepiane's anxiety
to a nervous off! i ction. 193
Graneros had other reasons for discrediHng Dellepiane.

A conspiracy had

developed within lrigoyen's Cabinet, headed by the Vice President, Enrique
Martinez, Elpidio Gonzalez, Juan de la Campa and Juan Graneros.

Aware of

Irigoyen's physical and mental unfitness, they considered his resignation inevitable.
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Worried by the administration's rapid loss of popularity, they viewed lrigoyen's
resignation as a necessity to restore popularity.

So the conspirators worked to

step into the presidency to save the U.C.R. 's predominance and their personal
privileged positions. 194
Uriburu exploited this internal struggle by assuring Enrique Martfnez that
the sole purpose of the revolution was to force out Irigoyen in order to place
Mart(nez in the presidency as the constitutional successor. 195

This is why he

and the others discredited Dellepiane's attempts to stop the military conspiracy
and to persuade lrigoyen that rumors about a revolution were false.

lrigoyen's

naivete made their plans easier and was only matched by their own naivete in
believing that the military uprising wou Id be made for thei r own personal ambi
tions for power. 196
On August 27, two of Dellepiane's aids infiltrated a large meeting of military
conspirators, bringing back to him a list of 36 army officers who had attended the
meeting.

The next day Dellepiane spoke with lrigoyen explaining the situation

and presenting two demands: to give him authority to arrest all known military
conspirators, and that Irigoyen dismiss the Interior Minister, Elpidio Gonz~lezl
Finance Minister, Enrique Perez Colman, the Chief of Police, Juan Graneros,
and others in ~he Cabinet as they were the main reason for public discontent that
i

had led to the revolutionary activities.
surrounded by traitors.

Dellepiane told Irigoyen that he was

lrigoyen reluctantly acceded to these demands. 197

Without delay, Dellepiane swung into action to neutralize the oncoming revolt.
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Gonzalez and Graneros, who had entered the presidential office toward the
end of Dellepiane's interview, convinced lrigoyen that Dellepiane was mistaken
and that the operation should be cancelled as it would incense the public.

Acting

upon their advice, lrigoyen told Delfepiane not to detain anyone without his ap
proval and that the second demand would not be met. 198
said, lilt is well.

Hearing this, Dellepiane

Now we will all sink and it's the President's fault. 11199

The

War Minister, feeling that his usefulness in lrigoyen's cabinet had ceased, resigned
on September 3, 1930.

In his letter of resignation he stated:

I am not political, but I am repulsed by what I see around me.
Incapable and ambitious people do fundamental work. I see
the people around you (Irigoyen) are interested in themselves
and few are loyal. There should be an investigation of many
people.. •• I only regret that I could not help you out of the
•• •••• 200
presen t CriSiS
As Delfepiane was the only Minister well informed about the mi litary conspiracy
and the only one willing to do anything effective against it, with his resignation
the government came to a rapid end.

Dellepiane's successor, Elpidio Gonzalez,

a Cabinet conspirator, did not attempt to halt the mi Iitary uprising. 201
The liga Patriotica and Liga Republicana provoked increasing turmoil during
the last days of August unti I the revolt.

Reaction agai nst Irigoyen was further

evidenced at the formal opening of the annual Palermo cattle show of the Argentine
Rural Society on August 31, 1930.

The Minister of Agriculture was shouted out of

the hall without delivering his scheduled speech. 202
On September 1, the university students in Buenos Aires joined in demonstrating
against the government.

They issued

(l

manifesto which denounced the governmental

crisis, and threatened to take to the streets in protest if the unconstitutional measures
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adopted by lri goyen and the admi nistrative corruption were not corrected
immedi ate Iy .203
The decisive event, which convinced the mi litary conspirators that the
revolution was already in the streets and it was time to act, occurred early in
the evening of September 4.

The university students had organized a demon

stration, several thousand strong, which vociferously asked for lrigoyen's resig
nation.

They violently confronted the police; the result was one dead and

several wounded. 204
This convinced the Cabinet conspirators that they should ask Irigoyen to
delegate his presidential authority to the Vice President.

On the afternoon of

September 5, Cabinet Ministers Gonzalez, Oyhanarte and de 10 Campa went to
lrigoyen's residence on Brazil Street.

Gonzalez spoke for the group.

upon hearing his purpose, dismissed him sharply.

lrigoyen,

Only the intervention of

Irigoyen1s personal physician finally convinced the President {who had been
running a high fever for the past several days)205 to delegate his authority to
the Vice President, Enrique Mart(nez. 206
The new acting-President immediately decreed a state of siege for thirty days
in Buenos Aires to control street demonstrations and to impede the expected military
uprisi ng. 207

In order to restore confidence in the government, Martinez ordered

a Cabinet shakeup.

The Ministers of Foreign Relations, Interior, Agriculture and

Navy were dismissed and new appointments made.

But the Foreign Minister,

Oyhanarte, denied Martinez the authority to effect these changes.
no ava it. 208

But it was to

76
General Uriburu, after gaining the support of the Justo faction in the Army,
gave orders to start the military uprising early on the morning of September 6,

1930.
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CHAPTER III

CONCLUSION

The causes of the revolution go beyond the events of 1928 to September 6,
1930.

The authors of the 1853 Constitution wanted to establish a democracy.

But they left the power in the hands of the dominant economic interests of the
nation.

As immigration increased so did the middle sectors· demand for a

voice in the government.
ernment, kept them out.

But the oligarchy, .which firmly controlled the gov
Their protests were in vain.

They could not achieve

any modifications in the government through legal channels.
open was revolution.

The only path

The abortive revolts of 1890, 1893, and 1905 followed.

Eventually the oligarchy realized that if the middle sectors achieved power
through a revolution, then their own power could easily be destroyed, along
with their financial base.

So overtures were made to bring the opposition into

the government.
It was all based on expediency.

Since the oligarchy did not want to be

destroyed they had to share their power.

This expediency did not create a

democratic system any more than the Constitution of 1853 had.

When the S~enz

Pena electoral reforms provided the basis for free elections, opposition faced op
position.

There were no parties or platforms.
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The struggle was for plain
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unadulterated power.

Nothing in the political arena had been institutionalized.

The conservatives were completely fragmentized with independent parties in each
of the provinces.

The opposition was little better with numerous parties scattered

throughout the nation.

In this chaotic situation Hip6lito Irigoyen had an advantage, as he was the
only presidential candidate in 1916 who had any type of an effective national
organization.

But what was more important, lrigoyen embodied the sentiments

of the middle sectors.

The people believed that he could fulfill their hope of

a decent and honorable life.

The people voted for Irigoyen for this reason alone.

His popularity was completely based on his personal integrity and ideals, not on
a program or plan for uplifting the people, as he had none.
his backing was personal, and it remained that way.

Because of this,

The loyalty was to the

man, not to the vague proposals that he cloaked in his Krausian phi losophy.
This was a serious deficiency in the democratic process.
were important and Hipolito Irigoyen was the man.
around him in 1916 and 1928.

Men, not issues,

The government revolved

This is why, after he had accomplished so little

during his first term, his popularity increased through Alvear's term, as no one
could embody the public spirit as lrigoyen had.

The people loved him--to a

point.
But there were other deficiencies, notably in the executive's dominance
over the rest of the government.

The Presid'3nt was responsible for most of the

governmental activities, and without his approval everything stopped.

As long
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as the executive was able to keep the government functioning on a smooth basis
there were no problems.

This had been the case up to 1928.

But when lrigoyen

arbitrarily insisted upon the scrutinization of every voucher that was to pass under
his nose, he quickly disrupted the governmental process.

Payments were held up,

contracts were not let I people were dismissed and not replaced.

The government

became disjointed, not from the world depression, but from lrigoyen's policies.
lrigoyen completely dominated his subordinates while directing the adminis
tration's policies.

He held all of the power.

The cabinet ministers could only

act with his approval; as such their function was to advise and obey.

For Irigoyen

to be competent he had to be well informed of the issues and public attitudes.
was not.

He

His intimate advisors lied to him, conspired against him, and isolated

him from the public.

This made the executive's dominance over the rest of the

government a complete liability.
To further his dominance, Irigoyen intervened in the provinces where the
opposition parties held power.

There were valid reasons for each of the inter

ventions, but in San Juan and Mendoza the interventors ruthlessly tried to obliterate
the opposition.

The obvious abrogation of the electoral laws caused public revul

sion throughout the nation.

These methods used in the suppression of the cantonistas

and the lencinistas were viewed as much worse than the injustices perpetrated by
these regimes.
The opposition saw two things: the government was not functioning properly
and their right to dissent was being challenged.

By mid-1930 it appeared that
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lrigoyen's desire to further obliterate the opposition was spreading.
paralyzed because of its opposition to lrigoyen.
the proposed Entre Rios intervention.

Congress was

And in August came the news of

How much further 'NOuld Irigoyen's usurpa

tion of power go?

If Irigoyen's desire to direct every detail of the notional government had been
backed by a purposeful program and had been executed in a methodical efficient
pattern, he would have been able to maintain popular support, even in the light
of his disregard of the Constitution and other laws.

But he had no plan.

The

only apparent goal was power, and he incompetently misused his power to bring
the nation to its knees, not the opposition.
The situation was unique.

lrigoyen was destroying the opposition by the

illegal and immoral methods that he had fought against for thirty years, but he
did not use the power that he had usurped.

It lay idle.

His operating on the

margin of legality could have generated support from the middle sectors, if he
had enacted some pervasive social measures; instead he only offered them token
panaceas.

He lost the support of the people.

This loss of support, due to lack

I

of ener6y, coupled with his maintaining power through illegal methods, provoked
I

the re.Jplution.
free

lrigoyen effectively destroyed the feVi democratic traditions and

in~titutions that

he had wanted so much to establish, by giving birth to the

I

succeeldi ng military governments.

I

I

I

I

I

I
I

I

I
I
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